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INTRODUCTION
In 1933, Illinois adopted a modem set of civil practice proce-
dures and modified its predominantly common law system of
pleading.' The Civil Practice Act-still with us as Article II of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure2 and known as the "Civil Practice
Law" 3-was the vehicle by which Illinois established this new code
for the pleading and adjudication of civil cases. The rules of the
Illinois Supreme Court supplement the statutes.' Moreover, hun-
dreds of appellate cases clarify the meaning and exemplify the ap-
plication of those statutes and rules in numerous situations.5
A principal purpose of the General Assembly in adopting the
legislation that comprises the Civil Practice Act was "to amalga-
mate in part equitable and common law jurisdiction in one form of
action."6 As noted, the amalgamation of chancery and common
law practice is partial, not complete; therefore, issues arise over
how to handle situations in which the practice is not or cannot be
fused. Such situations arise most frequently when the dispute cen-
ters around trial by jury.
Illinois, as do most states, guarantees litigants the right to trial
by jury in civil cases that seek common law relief or that are of a
common law character.7 In Illinois there is no constitutional or
1. Civil Practice Act of 1933, 1933 ILL. LAWS 784, art. 8, § 94 (eff. Jan. 1, 1933)
(revised and amended 1982).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-101 to 2-1903 (1989) (titled "Practice"); see
infra part I.B.
3. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-101(b) (1989) (stating that "Article II shall
be known as the 'Civil Practice Law' ").
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, paras. 1-300 (1989) (titled "Practice Rules" with Arti-
cle I subtitled "General Rules" and Article II subtitled "Rules on Civil Proceedings in
the Trial Court"); see infra part I.C.
5. See infra part II.
6. Frank v. Newburger, 298 Ill. App. 548, 553, 19 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1st Dist. 1939)
(emphasis added) (speaking to the general purpose of the Civil Practice Act); see also
Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 I11. 2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970) (stating the purpose of
the Act in proceedings for "Forcible Entry and Detainer"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 928
(1971); Frederick v. Maggio, 23 Ill. App. 2d 292, 162 N.E.2d 590 (1st Dist. 1960) (stating
the purpose of § 2-1401, previously § 72 of the Civil Practice Act); Paramount Paper
Tube Corp. v. Capital Engineering & Mfg. Co., 11 Ill. App. 2d 456, 138 N.E.2d 81 (1st
Dist. 1957) (same).
7. Illinois has wrestled, as have other jurisdictions, with issues such as whether the
right to trial by jury in a particular case depends on the nature of the remedy sought, the
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traditional right to trial by jury in cases seeking purely equitable
relief. Under Illinois's amalgamated-fused procedure, however, it
is unclear when to provide jury trials if demanded for the follow-
ing: (1) common law issues that exist or arise secondarily or inci-
dentally in otherwise purely equitable cases, or (2) common law
aspects of cases that combine common law and equity claims or
seek both common law and equitable relief.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the controlling provi-
sions of law that concern civil jury trials. Part II presents selected
cases and their holdings. An appendix describes additional statu-
tory jury trial references, which only apply in specific situations.
I. THE CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
The right to trial by jury in civil cases in Illinois is guaranteed
and governed by provisions found in the state constitution, the
Civil Practice Law, and the rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
In addition, there are jury-trial provisions in statutes that concern
some specific subjects of legislation.8
A. The Constitution of the State of Illinois
The 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois9 contains two pro-
visions that protect and define the right to trial by jury in civil
cases."0 Both are found among the provisions in article I, the "Bill
of Rights" article of the constitution. The first provision-the
more general of the two-declares with apparent simplicity: "The
right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain invio-
late." I The second provision deals specifically with compensation
issues in eminent domain cases: "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as pro-
vided by law. Such compensation shall be determined by a jury as
provided by law."' 2
historical character or analogue of the cause of action, or some combination of both.
This Article does not deal at length with these issues.
8. See infra part III.
9. ILL. CONST. of 1970 (adopted in convention Sept. 3, 1970; ratified by the people
Dec. 15, 1970; in force July 1, 1971).
10. The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is guaranteed in article I § 8. ILL.
CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8.
11. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 13 (titled "Trial by Jury").
12. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 15 (titled "Right of Eminent Domain").
[Vol. 22
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B. Civil Practice Statutes of the State of Illinois
Six sections of the Civil Practice Law 3 contain significant provi-
sions concerning jury trial in civil cases. Paragraph 2-614 governs
the "Joinder of causes of action and use of counterclaims."14 Para-
graph 2-619(c) directs "Involuntary dismissal based upon certain
defects or defenses." 5 Paragraph 2-701(d) governs "Declaratory
judgments."' 6 Paragraph 2-1006 concerns "Consolidation and sev-
erance of cases."' 7  Paragraph 2-1105(a) explains "Jury de-
mand."'" Finally, paragraph 2-1111 concerns "Juries in cases
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-101 to 2-1903 (1989); see supra note 23.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-614 (1989).
Joinder of causes of action and use of counterclaims.
(a) Any plaintiff or plaintiffs may join any causes of action, against any de-
fendant or defendants; and the defendant may set up in his or her answer any
and all cross claims whatever, whether in the nature of recoupment, setoff or
otherwise, which shall be designated counterclaims.
(b) The court may, in its discretion, order separate trial of any causes of
action, counterclaim or third-party claim if it cannot be conveniently disposed
of with the other issues in the case. Legal and equitable issues may be tried
together if no jury is employed.
Id. (emphasis added).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-619(c) (1989).
Involuntary dismissal based upon certain defects or defenses.
(c) If, upon the hearing of the motion, the opposite party presents affidavits
or other proof denying the facts alleged or establishing facts obviating the
grounds of defect, the court may hear and determine the same and may grant or
deny the motion. If a material and genuine disputed question of fact is raised
the court may decide the motion upon the affidavits and evidence offered by the
parties, or may deny the motion without prejudice to the right to raise the sub-
ject matter of the motion by answer and shall so deny it if the action is one in
which a party is entitled to a trial by jury and a jury demand has been filed by the
opposite party in apt time.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-701 (1989).
Declaratory judgments.
(d) If a proceeding under this Section involves the determination of issues of
fact triable by a jury, they shall be tried and determined in the same manner as
issues offact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which
the proceeding is pending.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1006 (1989). It provides: "Consolidation and
severance of cases. An action may be severed, and actions pending in the same court may
be consolidated, as an aid to convenience, whenever it can be done without prejudice to a
substantial right." Id.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1105(a) (1985).
Jury demand.
(a) A plaintiff desirous of a trial by jury must file a demand therefor with the
clerk at the time the action is commenced. A defendant desirous of a trial by
jury must file a demand therefor not later than the filing of his or her answer.
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 22
seeking equitable relief."' 9
C. Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois
Three Illinois Supreme Court Rules 20 also relate to the matter of
jury trials in civil cases. Rule 132 concerns the "Designation of
cases."21  Rule 135(a) speaks to "Pleading equitable matters. 22
Lastly, Rule 232 concerns the "Trial of equitable and legal
matters.
'23
Otherwise, the party waives a jury. If an action is filed seeking equitable relief
and the court thereafter determines that one or more of the parties is or are enti-
tled to a trial by jury, the plain tiff, within 3 days from the entry of such order by
the court, or the defendant, within 6 days from the entry of such order by the
court, may file his or her demand for trial by jury with the clerk of the court. If
the plaintiff files a jury demand and thereafter waives a jury, any defendant and,
in the case of multiple defendants, if the defendant who filed a jury demand
thereafter waives a. jury, any other defendant shall be granted a jury trial upon
demand therefor made promptly after being advised of the waiver and upon
payment of the proper fees, if any, to the clerk.
Id. (emphasis added).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1111 (1989). It provides: "Juries in cases seek-
ing equitable relief. The court may in its discretion direct an issue or issues to be tried by a
jury, whenever it is judged necessary in any action seeking equitable relief" Id. (emphasis
added).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, paras. I to 300 (1989) (titled "Practice Rules" with
Article I subtitled "General Rules" and Article II subtitled "Rules on Civil Proceedings
in the Trial Court").
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lI0A, para. 132 (1989).
Every complaint or other paper initiating any civil action or proceeding shall
contain in the caption the words "at law," "in chancery," "in probate," "small
claim," or other designation conforming to the organization of the circuit court
into divisions. Misdesignation shall not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
Id.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lI0A, para. 135(a) (1989).
Pleading Equitable Matters
(a) Single Equitable Cause of Action. Matters within the jurisdiction of a
court of equity, whether directly or as an incident to other matters before it, or
which an equity court can hear so as to do complete justice between the parties,
may be regarded as a single equitable cause of action and when so treated as a
single cause of action shall be pleaded without being set forth in separate counts
and without the use of the term "Count."
Id.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 232 (1989).
Trial of Equitable and Legal Matters.
(a) Trial of a Single Equitable Cause of Action. When matters are treated as
a single equitable cause of action as provided in Rule 135(a), they shall be heard
and determined in the manner heretofore practiced in courts of equity. When
legal and equitable matters that may be asserted separately are pleaded as pro-
vided in Rule 135, the court shall first determine whether the matters joined are
properly severable, and, if so, whether they shall be tried together or separately
and in what order.
(b) Trial of Joined Equitable and Legal Matters. If the court determines that
1991] Jury Trial in Illinois 631
II. JURIES AND CHANCERY: SELECTED CASE LAW DECISIONS
A. The Illinois Constitution and Differences
Between Law and Equity
It has been held that the Constitution requires certain distinc-
tions between law and equity. The former Civil Practice Act is to
be viewed in light of the Constitutional right to trial by jury and
the resulting distinction between law and equity.
In 1941, eight years after enactment of the Civil Practice Act,
the Illinois Supreme Court noted in Frank v. Salomon 24 that the
Act reflects a "clear legislative intention to affect only the adjective
as distinguished from the substantive law;" that "it was not the
legislative intent to abolish substantive distinctions;" and that "it
was the obvious intention to do away with [different] forms of
pleading but to preserve separate procedure in law and equity. '25
One of the separate substantive-procedural distinctions thus pre-
served is that concerning trial by jury: "Presumably the legislature
knew that the constitutional requirement of trial by jury in actions
at law necessitates a distinction between legal and equitable pro-
ceedings, and we may assume that fact was taken into considera-
tion when the [Civil Practice Act] statute was enacted. '26
It has been held, moreover, that the Illinois constitutional guar-
antee of trial by jury in common law cases is the principal rationale
for maintaining the distinction between law and chancery. For ex-
ample, in Serafin v. Reid,27 the plaintiff filed a bill in equity seeking
an injunction to prevent the defendant from breaching a written
agreement in which the defendant had acknowledged the paternity
of plaintiff's child and agreed to pay ten dollars weekly for the
child's support. The matter had been referred to a master pursuant
to then-applicable chancery procedure. The trial court thereafter,
the matters are severable, the issues formed on the law counts shall be tried
before a jury when a jury has been properly demanded, or by the court when a
jury has not been properly demanded. The equitable issues shall be heard and
decided in the manner heretofore practiced in courts of equity.
Id.
24. 376 I11. 439, 34 N.E.2d 424 (1941).
25. Id. at 444, 34 N.E.2d at 426.
26. Id. The precise issue in Frank was whether former § 72 (now § 2-1401 "Relief
from Judgments") applied to chancery decrees as well as to common-law judgments. The
specific holding was that former § 72 was applicable in common-law, but not in chancery,
cases, and that § 72 motions in the trial court were not available to attack chancery
decisions. Later, § 72 was amended to make the motion applicable to proceedings of
every character, whether common-law, equitable, or statutory. See Joint Committee
Comments, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 historical notes (1955).
27. 335 I11. App. 512, 82 N.E.2d 381 (1st Dist. 1948).
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in conformity with the master's recommendations, entered a decree
finding a specific sum due to the plaintiff and enjoined the defend-
ant from breaching the agreement. The chancellor specifically
found that "the decree is enforceable in equity on the theory that
the plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law."
'28
On appeal, the decree was reversed, with the cause remanded so
that the plaintiff could amend her pleadings and proceed at law.
Should the plaintiff elect not to proceed at law, however, it was
held that her complaint should be dismissed for want of equity. In
so ruling, the First District Illinois Appellate Court noted that the
ultimate relief sought by the plaintiff was'a common law money
judgment, that there were no special circumstances sufficient to
justify equitable jurisdiction, and that the parties' rights should
first be adjudicated in an action at law. The court stated, "Since
the adoption of the Civil Practice Act basic distinctions between
law and equity have been maintained and this distinction is necessi-
tated by the constitutional requirement of trial by jury in actions at
law. ",29
The impact of the constitutional guarantee was also discussed in
Rozema v. Quinn,3" filed initially as a mechanic's lien foreclosure
suit, in which the defendants demanded a jury trial for their com-
mon law counterclaim seeking a money judgment. The court char-
acterized the counterclaim as "within the class of cases to which
there existed a right to trial by jury at the request of either of the
parties. 3 1
On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that issues on the counterclaim
should have been tried by a jury. The court held that when the
defendants indicated to the trial court that they were not abiding
by their original jury trial request, the plaintiff should have made a
timely objection and sought severance of the law action if he de-
sired a jury trial. In its analysis of the issues, the court noted:
The enactment of the Civil Practice Act has greatly modified the
procedures in civil actions where both legal and equitable claims
are involved, but the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in
actions at law still requires that certain distinctions between law
and equity be retained. The procedural problem arises from the
fact that presently the forum has concurrent jurisdiction of both
28. Id. at 513, 82 N.E.2d at 381-82.
29. Id. at 514, 82 N.E.2d at 382 (citations omitted).
30. 51 111. App. 2d 479, 201 N.E.2d 649 (1st Dist. 1964). This case is also discussed
infra parts II.D, II.J, and II.V.
31. Id. at 487, 201 N.E.2d at 653.
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legal and equitable causes of action.32
B. Principles Concerning the Illinois Constitutional Right to
Trial by Jury as to Common Law Actions
The Illinois constitutional protection affording the right to trial
by jury in civil cases extends only to common law actions, as com-
mon law actions existed when the Illinois Constitution was
adopted. The nature of the controversy determines whether the
right to trial by jury exists, and it is not a matter of right in equity
proceedings. The right to a jury whose verdict is binding does not
apply in chancery causes unless specifically authorized by statute.
A number of Illinois Supreme Court cases confirm these princi-
ples. In Fisher v. Burgiel,33 the conservator of the estate of an in-
competent person sought and obtained a decree setting aside deeds
executed by the ward and directing that the defendants account as
fiduciaries for certain money and personalty. Affirming the decree,
the court rejected defendants' contention that the chancellor had
erred in striking their jury demand:
Trial by jury in such [equity] cases does not exist as a matter of
right, except in certain enumerated cases, notably contests of
wills. The rule in this State is that . . . a jury trial is never a
matter of right in a chancery case unless expressly made so by
statute. The right to a trial by jury which is guaranteed by the
Constitution applies only to actions known to the common law
and is not a matter of right in equity proceedings.34
There is, moreover, no constitutional right to trial by jury when
chancery properly assumes jurisdiction in a situation that other-
wise (at law) would require a multiplicity of common law actions.
A chancery adjudication in one proceeding of a controversy that
alternatively could have been adjudicated by way of a "multiplic-
ity" of common law actions does not change the rule. In Wein-
inger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co. ,35 the plaintiffs sought
recovery upon and apportionment of a fire loss among nineteen fire
insurance policies issued by sixteen defendant insurance carriers.
The court concluded that the case was proper for the assumption
of jurisdiction by a court of equity in order to avoid a multiplicity
of suits and because an accounting was involved. As to defendants'
claim that they were entitled to a jury trial, the court stated:
32. Id. at 484, 201 N.E.2d at 652 (citations omitted).
33. 382 Ill. 42, 46 N.E.2d 380 (1943).
34. Id. at 54, 46 N.E.2d at 386 (citations omitted).
35. 359 Ill. 584, 195 N.E. 420 (1935).
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Since we have resolved the question of jurisdiction against the
defendants, it follows that the constitutional question is decided
against them. The right of trial by jury guaranteed by the Consti-
tution is only in such actions as were known to the common law.
Where equity takes jurisdiction, the defendants are not deprived
of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. A trial by jury is
not a matter of right in an equity proceeding. a6
Nor does the constitutional right to jury trial extend to chancery
claims created by statute. In Flaherty v. Murphy,3" the plaintiffs
filed a bill in chancery, as authorized by the Dramshop Act, to
subject property owned by the defendant to a lien and sale in order
to satisfy a judgment previously recovered in an action at law
against a saloon owner and tenant of that property. In addition to
rejecting defendant's attack on the constitutionality of the Act's
provision authorizing this remedy, the court held that the defend-
ant was not entitled to a jury trial:
Section 5 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1870, which provides
that "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate," means that the right to a jury trial shall continue in all
cases where such right existed at the time the Constitution was
adopted. That right cannot be taken away. A jury trial is never a
matter of right in chancery proceedings, except where by statute
it is expressly given. The action under section 10 of the Dram-
shop Act is an action in rem, and the decree entered therein is in
no way a personal decree, and while the test whether or not the
right to trial by jury exists in a given case depends on the nature
of the controversy, rather than the form of the action, there was
no right of trial by jury on such issue as is raised by section 10, or
on one analogous thereto, provided for under the laws of this
state prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1870. The
chancellor, therefore, did not err in denying [defendant's] de-
mand for a jury.3"
C. The United States Constitution Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial in Common Law Cases
The right to a jury trial in federal civil cases is guaranteed by the
seventh amendment to the United States Constitution. Federal
cases hold that this federal civil jury trial guarantee applies only to
the national government and not to the states. Thus, the states
36. Id. at 590, 195 N.E. at 422.
37. 291 Ill. 595, 126 N.E. 553 (1920).
38. Id. at 597, 126 N.E. at 554-55 (citation omitted); see also Lazarus v. Village of
Northbrook, 31 111. 2d 146, 199 N.E.2d 797 (1964) (holding that jury trial as guaranteed
in the Illinois Constitutions only applies to common law claims).
[Vol. 22
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need not provide the jury required in federal courts by the seventh
amendment when a federally-created cause of action is tried in
state courts.39 The right to trial by jury in civil cases in each state
is, therefore, governed by that state's own constitution, statutes,
and case law.
Illinois courts, too, confirm the notion that the seventh amend-
ment is not applicable to state courts. In an early case, Keith v.
Henkleman, ° the Illinois Supreme Court held that a jury was not
required when a trial court, having jurisdiction over a chancery
suit to reform and correct an injunction bond, enforced it as re-
formed by assessing the damages recoverable under the bond by
reason of the issuance of the injunction for which the bond had
been furnished:
It is well settled that, when a court of equity has jurisdiction of a
cause for one purpose, it will retain such jurisdiction for all pur-
poses. When the controversy requires any purely equitable relief,
such as will give a court of equity the right to act, the court will
proceed to a determination of all the matters at issue; and in do-
ing so it may establish purely legal rights and grant legal reme-
dies, which would otherwise be beyond its power .... [A] jury
trial is never a matter of right in a chancery case .... In addition
to this, the first 10 articles of amendment to the federal constitu-
tion were not intended to limit the powers of the state govern-
ments in respect to their own people, but to operate on the
national government alone.4"
More recently, in In re Grabow's Estate,42 a legatee of an estate
attempted without success to claim the right to have a jury hear
evidence concerning objections to an executor's accounting. The
court said:
While Article I, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
provides: "The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall
remain inviolate," this provision does not confer a right to a jury
in any class of cases where either it had not previously existed or
the proceeding was created by statute and was unknown to the
common law. Probate is a purely statutory proceeding and, un-
less the statutes provide a right to jury in a probate proceeding,
as is done in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110 1/2, par. 16-3 for a
39. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); see also Howl-
ett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2440 n.17 (1990); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6
(1974); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 170 n.4 (1973); School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253 n.17 (1963); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
124-125 (1959); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 365 (1952).
40. 173 Ill. 137, 50 N.E. 692 (1898).
41. Id. at 141, 50 N.E. at 693.
42. 74 Ill. App. 3d 336, 392 N.E.2d 980 (3d Dist. 1979).
1991]
Loyola University Law Journal
limited purpose of discovery, and recovery of property of the es-
tate, there exists no right to a jury in probate proceedings. In
addition, the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the
United States does not apply to State courts. 43
D. Power of the Court to Decide Legal and Equitable Claims
Joined in One Action
If there is no jury demand, a trial judge, having power under
post-1933 procedures to sit as both common law judge and equity
chancellor, has jurisdiction to decide a case that joins both legal
and equitable claims. On the other hand, it has been noted that if a
jury has been demanded (and not thereafter waived expressly or by
implication), a severable law claim joined with an equity claim may
not be tried in the chancery suit. In that situation, a judge sitting
as chancellor does not have jurisdiction to decide the issues that
properly should be presented to a jury. In Rozema v. Quinn," the
court rejected the plaintiff's contention, in a mechanic's lien fore-
closure suit, that a master-in-chancery was without authority to
hear the defendant's common law counterclaim. The defendant in-
itially had filed a jury demand, and then the defendant requested-
without plaintiff's objection or request for a severance-that the
case be referred generally to a master. In rejecting the plaintiff's
argument, the court stated:
To determine the issues raised by this appeal it is necessary to
consider whether a court of chancery has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of defendant's counterclaim. As spoken of here,
jurisdiction is the power to adjudge concerning the general ques-
tion involved, and concerns itself with whether the action states a
claim belonging to the general class of cases over which the au-
thority of the court may properly extend .... The procedural
problem arises from the fact that presently the forum has concur-
rent jurisdiction of both legal and equitable causes of action....
When read together, it is the clear import of sec. 44 [now § 2-
614] and Rule 11 [now Rule 232] that where no demand for a
jury is made in cases involving the joinder of legal and equitable
causes of action, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the entire
cause.... On the other hand, where a law and equity action are
joined but a proper demand for a jury in the law action is made,
the latter cannot be tried with the chancery action.4"
43. Id. at 337, 392 N.E.2d at 982 (citation omitted).
44. 51 Ill. App. 2d 479, 201 N.E.2d 649 (1st Dist. 1964). This case is also discussed
supra parts II.A. and infra parts II.J. and II.V.
45. Id. at 485, 201 N.E.2d at 653.
[Vol. 22
Jury Trial in Illinois
The right to jury trial exists as to common law issues added to a
chancery suit seeking to restrain publication of alleged libelous
matter. Where, in an equity suit seeking to enjoin publication of
alleged libelous matter, an additional count is added seeking com-
pensatory and punitive damages, the defendant is then entitled to
seek a jury trial on the law issues presented by the additional
count. In Gariepy v. Springer,46 an injunction granted at the re-
quest of the plaintiff, an attorney, was disapproved, and on the
question of defendant's right to trial by jury, the appellate court
said:
Having demanded a jury at the earliest possible moment after
being confronted with a suit for damages, as to which he was
entitled to a trial by jury, it is difficult to conceive that he could
have asserted the right guaranteed him by the constitution, as
well as the law of the State, at any earlier time. The contention
that there were no severable issues raised by the additional count,
and that 'equity properly did complete justice,' is likewise unten-
able. The original complaint was for injunctive relief. The addi-
tional count sought damages, both compensatory and punitive.
Plaintiff certainly intended to treat the count at law as distinct
from the count in equity, and the court evidently decided that the
two causes of action were distinct, for it did not refuse a jury trial
on the ground that the two counts could be tried together as a
proceeding in equity."
The severance of a previously-consolidated law action and chan-
cery suit is proper where a jury demand exists. In Hunsberger v.
Mitchell,48 an action at law on a promissory note had initially been
consolidated with a chancery suit in which the plaintiff and the
defendant in the law action were, along with others, defendants in
the chancery suit. The defendant in the law action filed a jury de-
mand. The trial court thereafter vacated the order of consolidation
and was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court held that because
a jury had been demanded, the law action could not be tried with
the chancery suit and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
vacating the original consolidation order.
E. Equity Jurisprudence and the Denial of Jury Trials
The general rule in Illinois is that absent an express constitu-
tional or statutory provision to the contrary, there is no trial by
46. 318 Ill. App. 523, 48 N.E.2d 572 (1st Dist. 1943). The case is also discussed infra
part II.J.
47. Id. at 531, 48 N.E.2d at 576.
48. 333 Ill. App. 644, 78 N.E.2d 857 (1st Dist. 1948).
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jury as of right in chancery proceedings. In Martin v. Strubel,49 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that this principle applies in the adju-
dication of deficiency amounts in mortgage-foreclosure proceed-
ings. The question before the court in Martin was whether a
mortgagor is deprived of due process of law and the right of trial
by jury"° by the statute that confers power on courts of equity to
render deficiency decrees for money amounts in foreclosure pro-
ceedings. The statute read in part:
In all decrees hereafter to be made in suits in equity directing
foreclosure of mortgages, a decree may be rendered for any bal-
ance of money that may be found due to the complainant, over
and above the proceeds of the sale or sales, and execution may
issue for the collection of such balance, the same as when the
decree is solely for the payment of money.
The deficiency decree for $1,150 had been entered, notwithstand-
ing the mortgagor-appellants' demand for trial by jury, which the
trial court denied:
[I]n the absence of express statutory or constitutional provisions,
a jury is no part of the chancery system. With certain statutory
exceptions, not relevant here, no such provisions exist in Illinois.
In this state the guaranty of the right to a jury trial does not
extend to cases of equity jurisdiction, such as a bill to foreclose a
mortgage. It is well settled that when a court of equity has juris-
diction of a cause for one purpose, it will retain such jurisdiction
for all related purposes. When the controversy requires any
purely equitable relief, such as will give a court of equity the right
to act, the court will proceed to determine all matters at issue and
do complete justice between the parties. In so doing, a court of
chancery may, if it sees fit, establish purely legal rights and grant
legal remedies in the same proceeding, which would otherwise be
beyond its power. The concurrent jurisdiction of equity may
thus adjust claims against the property arising out of tort or con-
tract, and make all proper orders in respect to the time and man-
ner of their payment. The provision of the Constitution of 1870,
prescribing the right to trial by jury, does not extend to cases in
equity but is confined to cases at law.5'
Houston v. Brackett s2 was a contested adoption proceeding in
which the jury demand by the respondent, the natural father and
former husband, was rejected. The court found the father to be
49. 367 Il1. 21, 10 N.E.2d 325 (1937).
50. At the time of the Martin case, the right to a jury trial was guaranteed under then
§§ 2 and 5 of article 2 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution.
51. Id. at 22, 10 N.E.2d at 326 (citations omitted).
52. 38 Il. App. 2d 463, 187 N.E.2d 545 (2d Dist. 1963).
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unfit as alleged, and an adoption decree was entered in favor of the
petitioners, natural mother and her present husband. Affirming
the decree, the appellate court noted, on the jury-trial issue, that:
The right of trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution obtains
only in such actions as were known to the common law. The
adoption of children was unknown to the common law and it is
governed solely by statute. In adoption cases the jurisdiction of
the court over the child is the same as that exercised by courts of
chancery and a trial by jury is not a matter of right in an equity
proceeding.... Since adoption is a statutory proceeding, and the
court's jurisdiction is similar to that exercised by courts of chan-
cery, we conclude that the denial of Brackett's demand for a jury
trial on the issue of his unfitness was a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that in the absence of any show-
ing of abuse of such discretion or necessity for trial of such issue
by a jury, the trial court committed no error in denying the de-
mand for a trial by jury.53
Lundy v. Messer54 was a suit by partners to foreclose a mortgage
given as security for debts owed for services rendered by the part-
nership. On appeal by the defendant-mortgagor, the court noted
that when a court of equity has jurisdiction of a cause for one pur-
pose, such as to foreclose a mortgage, it retains jurisdiction for all
related purposes. The court in such cases will proceed to deter-
mine all matters at issue and do complete justice and in so doing,
may establish what may otherwise be purely legal rights that may
have been beyond its power. On the question of the right to a jury,
the court stated, in accordance with the general rule, that, in the
absence of express statutory or constitutional provisions, a jury is
not part of the chancery system, and the constitutional right of
jury trial does not extend to causes of equity jurisdiction such as a
suit to foreclose a mortgage. The defendant-mortgagor's position
was that a jury should have been impaneled to decide questions of
fact as to the employment of the partners to represent the defend-
ant, the services rendered, the fair and reasonable value of the serv-
ices, and the partnership's expenses. Thus, it was held that the
trial court did not err and did not abuse its discretion in failing to
direct such issues to a jury.
There is no right to trial by jury in a suit brought under the
equitable doctrine of constructive trust to recover property taxes
avoided by reason of a tax reduction scheme. In People ex rel
53. Id. at 468, 187 N.E.2d at 548 (citations omitted).
54. 25 Ill. App. 2d 513, 167 N.E.2d 278 (2d Dist. 1960), appeal after remand, 32 Ill.
App. 2d 303, 177 N.E.2d 863 (1961).
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Daley v. Warren Motors, Inc.," the Cook County State's Attorney
brought suit under the equitable doctrine of constructive trust to
recovery property taxes that had been avoided by reason of an al-
leged illegal real estate tax reduction scheme. On appeal from
judgment imposing a constructive trust, the court approved the
trial court's actions in denying defendants' motion to sever any eq-
uitable cause of action from any common law counts, and in strik-
ing defendants' jury demand and exercising its equitable
jurisdiction. Also, the court held that the suit was properly filed to
recover, under the constructive trust theory, property taxes that
the defendants had avoided by participating in a tax reduction
scheme with certain public officials; that benefits realized by the
defendants as a result of the tax reduction scheme could be sub-
jected to the constructive trust; and that the evidence supported
the finding that defendant-taxpayers should have known that the
parties employed to obtain a reduction in property assessments did
so by illegal means. In so holding, the court rejected defendants'
claim that when legal and equitable issues are formed in the same
proceeding any legal issue for which a proper demand for a jury
has been made must be submitted to a jury. The court noted:
The trial court acted properly in striking the jury demand. The
Supreme Court has stated that the right to a jury trial is deter-
mined by the nature of the issue to be tried. Here the one-count
complaint presents the issue of whether the defendants should be
declared constructive trustees of benefits they received through
the fraudulent acts of deputy commissioners Lavin and Erskine.
The trial court was correct in exercising its equitable
jurisdiction.56
There is no right to trial by jury in an equity proceeding, even
though a decree may have the same effect as a common law judg-
ment in ejectment. Harding v. Fuller57 was a suit dealing with four
consolidated petitions under a statute known as the Burnt Records
Act. The Act empowered courts of equity, without a jury trial, to
establish title to land where the records had been destroyed. The
decree as to each petition found the petitioner to be the owner in
fee simple of the lot described therein; confirmed and established
title in the petitioner, enjoined defendants from interfering with pe-
titioner's possession of the premises and from claiming title to the
real estate except through the petitioner; directed defendants in
possession to surrender the premises to the petitioner; and ordered
55. 114 Ill. 2d 305, 500 N.E.2d 22 (1986).
56. Id. at 316, 500 N.E.2d at 27 (citation omitted).
57. 141 Il1. 308, 30 N.E. 1053 (1892).
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that in the event of failure to surrender, a writ of assistance was to
issue under which petitioner was to be put in possession. On ap-
peal, the appellant's main contention was that each suit was an
action of ejectment brought on the equity side of the court under
the cover of a proceeding under the Burnt Records Act, for the
purpose of getting possession of the property without a jury trial
on the issue of title. The court held:
If these proceedings are properly brought under the "burnt
records act," the objection that the court establishes the title
without a trial thereof by jury is without force. The question as
to whether or not this act is constitutional, as depriving the par-
ties of the right of a trial by jury, has been before this tribunal in
a number of cases, and we have held that in this respect the act is
a valid law....
"It has been a common practice for years to file bills in equity
to partition lands, and in a proceeding of that character the court
has ample power to settle all conflicting titles, and that, too, with-
out a jury. The power conferred upon a court of equity by the
burnt records act is similar to a proceeding in equity for parti-
tion, and a proceeding under the former act is no more obnoxious
to the constitutional provision for a jury than is a bill in equity
for partition." It matters not what may have been the motive of
each one of these petitioners in filing a petition in equity under
the burnt records act. It matters not that the effect of a decree
confirming the title under the act may be the same as the effect of
a judgment obtained in an action of ejectment. The material
question is whether the facts alleged in the petition are sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter .... The fact
that there are adverse claimants is not an objection to proceeding
under the act; and the statute does not require the court to remit
the case to a court of law after restoring the evidences of title, but
authorizes the court to inquire into and establish the title.5"
There is no right to a jury trial as to the granting of injunctive
relief. In City of Girard v. Girard Egg Corp. ,9 the plaintiff alleged
violation of city ordinances by the defendant in the operation of its
business and sought to enjoin the public nuisance. Injunctive relief
was granted, based upon evidence concerning the effect of the de-
fendant egg company's operations on persons in the neighborhood
and evidence concerning obnoxious odors, the great quantities of
flies caused by the defendant's business, and the defendant's inabil-
ity or unwillingness to correct the situation. The injunction per-
petually enjoined defendant from operating its business within the
58. Id. at 312, 30 N.E. at 1054-55 (citations omitted).
59. 87 I11. App. 2d 74, 230 N.E.2d 294 (4th Dist. 1967).
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City of Girard. On appeal, the defendant contentded that it had
been improperly denied a trial by jury. The appellate court re-
jected this argument, stating, "The gist of this action was a suit in
equity to enjoin a public nuisance. The judgment of the court was
that the injunction should issue. There is no right to a jury trial on
the question of whether or not an injunction shall be granted."'
There is no right to jury trial as to damages awarded as equitable
relief in equity actions arising out of refusal to perform real estate
sale contracts. Gordon v. Bauer61 started out as a suit by purchas-
ers against vendors for damages and for specific performance of
contracts for the sale of real estate. Claims by and against the bro-
ker were also joined in the case. After nine days of a nineteen day
bench trial, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the part of their com-
plaint seeking specific performance, electing instead to pursue only
their damage claims. In that motion, the plaintiffs asserted, with a
supporting affidavit, that specific performance was no longer a via-
ble remedy for them, since there had been a dramatic decline in the
value of farm real estate during the two years between execution of
the contracts and the trial and the market value of the subject real
estate at the time of trial was substantially lower than the contract
price. The motion was allowed and the trial court subsequently
found for the plaintiffs and awarded damages. The defendant-ven-
dors appealed asserting a number of points, the initial ones relating
to the trial court's decision to allow plaintiffs to continue the trial
in equity on the damage claims after they had voluntarily dis-
missed the specific performance claims. The appellate court ruled:
The trial court ruled that the damage claims were equitable
claims.... The trial court then held that because the damages
were equitable, it had the authority, as a court of equity, to hear
the case and grant or deny the damages.... We agree with the
holding of the trial court, however, that it had jurisdiction in eq-
uity to award the damages and that the damages constituted eq-
uitable relief even after the court dismissed the specific
performance counts.... If the court had acted at law, the [de-
fendants] could have requested a jury trial and the court could
have granted that request at its discretion. Because the court ac-
ted in equity, however, the [defendants] were not entitled to a
jury trial, and thus the court did not act improperly by continu-
ing with the bench trial.62
60. Id. at 75, 230 N.E.2d at 295.
61. 177 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 532 N.E.2d 855 (5th Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 125 Il. 2d
564, 537 N.E.2d 809 (1989).
62. Id. at 1081, 532 N.E.2d at 859, 860, 863 (citation omitted).
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To the extent that equity deprives one of the right to a jury trial,
it does so only where the law may not provide an adequate remedy.
People ex rel. Barrett v. Fritz63 reversed a decree that had granted,
at the instigation of the Illinois Attorney General, an injunction
against some 1400 named and innumerable unnamed and un-
known persons from committing certain crimes. The appellate
court gave various reasons for rejecting the theory of the com-
plaint, among which was the following:
It seems to us that this is an attempted revolutionary revision of
the principles of our government and amounts to an astounding
assertion of a principle of equity jurisprudence. One of the first
principles of civil rights recognized for hundreds of years is, that
no man shall be deprived of his right of trial by jury. When eq-
uity deprives that right, it is with intense reluctance and based on
the necessity of a given case where law may not give an adequate
remedy.64
F. Jury Trials May Be Required in Chancery Causes and Courts
The right to a jury trial exists in chancery cases to the extent
that trial by jury is required under the constitution. In Gage v.
Ewing,61 a complainant filed suit in chancery to set aside certain
allegedly void tax deeds, claiming that they amounted to clouds
upon the title. The defendant's plea that there was an adequate
remedy at law in the action of ejectment was overruled, on the
ground that an 1872 statute conferred jurisdiction on chancery
courts to hear and determine bills to quiet title and remove clouds
from title in such circumstances. The Illinois Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the statute, although the cloud sought
to be removed was "but a mere adverse legal title to the land" for
which the Illinois Constitution provides a right to trial by jury:
Admitting that by this statute there may be drawn into investiga-
tion and determination, in chancery, questions of mere legal title
to lands, where, before, the remedy was only by action of eject-
ment at law, it does not follow that there would, from the statute,
be any impairment of the right of trial by jury. Conferring juris-
diction in chancery is not excluding trial by jury. Courts of chan-
cery may submit issues of fact to trial by jury, and although it is
discretionary to do so in their ordinary course of practice, yet
where there comes bestowal upon such a court jurisdiction in a
case where there existed, before the adoption of the constitution,
63. 316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1942).
64. Id. at 230, 45 N.E.2d at 54.
65. 107 Il. 11 (1883). This case is also discussed infra part ILL.
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the right of trial by jury, it is to be presumed that there would be,
in such case, allowance of jury trial, that there would be obedi-
ence to the constitutional injunction that the right of trial by
jury, as enjoyed at the time of the adoption of the constitution,
should remain inviolate. Should there at any time, in such a case,
be denial of such right, then there might arise ground of com-
plaint of the violation of this right of jury trial secured by the
constitution; but it would come from the action of the court in
the administration of the law, and not from the statute itself.66
Jury trials are conducted in chancery cases when a jury trial is a
matter of right. French v. French 67 was a suit by a wife asking for
separate maintenance from her husband in which the husband
cross-claimed for divorce, and the parties waived jury trial. The
trial court dismissed the suit for divorce and entered a decree of
separate maintenance.
On appeal, the decisions below were reversed and the cause re-
manded. The rationale for the reversal had to do with the failure
of the record to show that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
decree or to sustain those factual allegations not admitted in the
defendant's answer; such was the rule generally applicable at the
time in chancery cases, except for chancery cases tried before a
jury as a matter of right.68
A right to trial by jury does not take a suit out of a chancery
court's jurisdiction. A suit to set aside tax deeds as clouds upon
title to unimproved and unoccupied land, filed pursuant to a stat-
ute that confers jurisdiction upon chancery in suits to quiet title
and remove clouds on title to real estate, remains within the juris-
diction of the court of equity, notwithstanding the constitutional
right that a jury be impaneled to decide certain matters and
notwithstanding that there is an analogous common law remedy of
ejectment.69 In Turnes v. Brenckle,7 ° the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a statute amending the
mechanic's lien law to provide that where the chancellor in a
mechanic's lien foreclosure suit finds the claimant not entitled to a
lien, the claimant may recover at law against the owner of the
property in the chancellor's discretion. That court found the stat-
ute to be unconstitutional as improper special legislation and in
66. Id. at 15-16.
67. 302 Il. 152, 134 N.E. 33 (1922).
68. Id. at 158, 134 N.E. at 35-36.
69. Gage v. Ewing, 107 Ill. 11 (1883). The case is also discussed infra part II.L.
70. 249 Ill. 394, 396, 94 N.E. 495, 497 (1911). This case is also discussed infra parts
II.L. and II.N.
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conflict with the right to and mode of securing trial by jury in
''purely legal cases."
In a condemnation suit where there is a right to trial by jury, the
proceeding retains equitable characteristics. Chicago & Northwest
Railway Co. v. Miller7 involved the trial of a condemnation suit, in
which there is a constitutional right to trial by jury for the purpose
of fixing the amount of compensation and damages due persons
having interests in the property. A cross-petition was filed assert-
ing ownership of the property in fee and denying the interests of
others who were occupying the premises under the alleged leases.
The trial court held that the leases were void by reason of the stat-
ute of frauds and that the total value to be fixed by the jury in the
condemnation proceeding should be paid to the fee-owner. The
supreme court agreed with the position of the appellant-tenants
that, in equity, appropriate part-performance by the tenants would
take the leases out of the statute of frauds, and in a condemnation
proceeding, the settlement of issues as to interests in the property is
equitable in character:
In a condemnation proceeding under the eminent domain act the
jury is impaneled to fix the amount of compensation and dam-
ages which are to be paid to the owner or owners and parties
interested in the property sought to be condemned, and it has
nothing to do with the title to the property sought to be taken.
The question of title, if any such question is raised, should be
determined and settled by the court prior to the time the ques-
tions of compensation and damages are submitted to the jury....
In the determination and settlement of the interests of the respec-
tive parties ... the court was not restricted to mere legal titles,
but had the power to ascertain the rights of the parties therein,
whether such rights were legal or equitable in their nature.
While... in the trial of a condemnation suit either party is enti-
tled to have a jury, and the introduction of evidence and mode of
conducting the trial after the jury is impaneled is according to the
rules of practice in trials at law, and in that sense a proceeding to
condemn property under the eminent domain act is a legal and
not an equitable one, in the determination and settlement of the
title of the parties to a condemnation suit to the property sought
to be condemned equitable as well as legal rights must be taken
into consideration, and in the settlement of the question of title
the proceeding is equitable in its character.72
71. 233 Il1. 508, 84 N.E. 683 (1908).
72. Id. at 510-11, 84 N.E. at 684-85 (citations omitted).
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G. The Right to Jury Trial in Cases Seeking Both Legal and
Equitable Relief
The right to jury trial on issues of law is guaranteed unless
waived or until the court correctly holds that decisions on equita-
ble issues are res judicata. In Aetna Screw Products Co. v. Borg,73
suit was initiated by a buyer of stock who alleged breach of a tax
indemnification provision of the contract of sale. The seller-de-
fendant filed an answer, a jury demand, and a counterclaim in eq-
uity seeking reformation of the contract. At the seller's request,
the trial court heard the seller's reformation counterclaim first, and
thereafter, denied the reformation relief; refused to impanel a jury
on the breach of contract claim; and entered judgment on that
claim for the buyer. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed on the
seller's reformation issue, and reversed as to the buyer's contract
claim:
A complaint alleging breach of contract and resulting damages is
an action cognizable at common law. Therefore, once [seller]
timely filed his jury demand in conformity with the requirements
of... the Civil Practice Act he was guaranteed his right to a jury
trial until he waived it or the court correctly determined that its
holding on the equitable issues, heard first, was res judicata as to
all legal issues as well....
[Seller] did not waive his right to trial by jury either when he
filed his counterclaim in equity or when he requested that the
reformation issue be heard first .... [There is not] sufficient iden-
tity of issues and facts to create a situation in which a decision on
the equitable claim would be res judicata as to the legal claim.74
H. Powers of Judges Who Exercise Both Common Law and
Chancery Jurisdiction
Where there is no demand for jury trial, judges are authorized to
try equitable actions together with actions at law. Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. First Arlington National Bank 75 involved an action by
the plaintiff title-company against a general contractor and con-
struction-loan borrowers seeking restitution for overpayment from
an escrow account. The plaintiff was later permitted to amend its
complaint to include a tort count for deceit. Although the defend-
ants filed no jury demand, they claimed that because the case was
73. 116 Ill. App. 3d 206, 451 N.E.2d 1260 (1st Dist. 1983).
74. Id. at 213, 451 N.E.2d at 1266 (citations omitted).
75. 118 I11. App. 3d 401, 454 N.E.2d 723 (1st Dist. 1983).
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tried in the chancery division of the circuit court, the tort action
should have been dismissed "for want of equity." The appellate
court did not agree:
[W]hen (as in this case) there has been no demand for jury trial,
Supreme Court Rule 232 authorizes the court to try an equitable
action together with an action at law. We consequently find no
merit in the argument that the action at law for deceit should
have been dismissed "for want of equity."
76
Courts with jurisdiction over suits seeking chancery relief such
as specific performance have power to grant alternative damage
remedies, after concluding that chancery relief itself is inappropri-
ate. For example, chancery relief may be inappropriate because of
the time the case has been pending or actions by the defendant that
render an equitable remedy inappropriate. In Lenti v. Colomb,7
the plaintiff-vendors sought specific performance of a contract for
sale of a restaurant business and also claimed damages. After evi-
dentiary hearings, the trial court concluded that specific perform-
ance was then an inappropriate remedy because of the expiration of
time for payment of purchase price installments and defendant's
sale of the property that was to have been subjected to a chattel
mortgage. Rather than enter an alternate damage remedy, the trial
court dismissed the case from the equity division and transferred it
to the law division. The plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the
chancery division, having jurisdiction over the case, should have
retained it to consider the plaintiffs' claim for damages. The appel-
late court reversed and remanded:
The suit . . . was therefore properly brought in equity, and the
equity court properly assumed jurisdiction over it .... Events
occurring after the suit was filed, none of which was attributable
to the plaintiffs rendered specific performance no longer an ap-
propriate remedy. Under these circumstances, we think the
court of equity should have retained the case for consideration of
plaintiffs' claim for damages. The parties were put to a lengthy
and expensive hearing before a Master in Chancery, at which all
of the factual and legal issues were litigated. It would seem
grossly unfair as well as unnecessary to require them to begin
again in a court of law.78
A judge exercising both common law and chancery powers has
the right to make the issue one at law and to call a jury to try that
issue. There are Illinois cases, predating the 1933 Civil Practice
76. Id. at 414, 454 N.E.2d at 732 (citation omitted).
77. 74 Ill. App. 2d 94, 220 N.E.2d 65 (1st Dist. 1966).
78. Id. at 98, 220 N.E.2d at 67.
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Act, in which both chancery and common law issues have been
adjudicated and in which juries as of right have been impaneled.
In Lewark v. Dodd,7 9 the plaintiff filed a bill in equity to contest a
will on behalf of a minor, claiming incapacity of the testator and
undue influence by the sole devisee. A jury returned a verdict in
favor of the contestant, and the trial court decreed that the will
was void.
On appeal, the proponents of the will did not question the ver-
dict, but claimed: (a) that the court erred in decreeing the will to be
void in its entirety, instead of limiting the effect of the decree to the
interest of the minor contestant; and (b) that no issue of law had
been properly made up as to whether the writing was the last will
of the testator. The relevant statute provided that "an issue at law
shall be made up whether the writing produced be the will of the
testator or testatrix or not" and directed the trial of that issue by
jury. The court agreed with the proponents that the probate may
be void so far as concerns the interest of the contesting heirs who
had been under disability, yet valid so far as the will concerns heirs
who had lost their rights to contest the will by lapse of time. Con-
cerning the issue presented to the jury in the proceeding, the court
declared:
Under our system the same judge exercises both common-law
and chancery jurisdiction in the same court at the same time, and
he may make the issue at law and immediately call a jury to try
it. This practice has made it unnecessary in our courts to follow
some of the rules which prevailed under the system of separate
courts of chancery and common-law jurisdiction, and in practice
some of such rules are disregarded."0
Failure by the court to decide issues that can be determined
without a jury may be error. In a separate maintenance suit, the
failure of the trial court to rule on a wife's claim that she was enti-
tled to have fifty shares of stock restored to her or in the alterna-
tive, a judgment against defendant for the amount derived from
sale of the shares was error. Such issues could be determined by
the court without a jury, regardless of whether they present legal
or equitable problems for solution.8 '
79. 288 I11. 80, 123 N.E. 260 (1919).
80. Id. at 86, 123 N.E. at 263.
81. Glennon v. Glennon, 299 I11. App. 13, 19 N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist. 1939).
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I. Waiver of Trial by Jury in Cases Presenting Both Legal and
Equitable Claims
A defendant does not waive the right to a jury merely by filing a
counterclaim in equity or by requesting that an equity issue be
heard first. In Aetna Screw Products Co. v. Borg,s2 a buyer of stock
alleged breach of a tax indemnification provision of the contract of
sale, and the seller-defendant filed an answer, jury demand, and
counterclaim in equity seeking reformation of the contract. The
question arose as to whether the seller, by filing a counterclaim in
equity or by making a request that its reformation issue be heard
first, waived the right to trial by jury. The appellate court held
that these actions did not amount to a waiver and the decision on
the equitable claim was not resjudicata as to the legal claim:
In the instant case, the only similarity between the equitable and
legal issues is that [defendant's] counterclaim for reformation
was the same as one of his four affirmative defenses filed in his
answer to [plaintiff's] breach of contract action .... It is clear to
us that not only did [defendant] make a proper jury demand, but
he strongly and correctly objected to the court's decision that the
causes of action were identical .... [W]e reverse the trial court's
denial of [defendant's] jury demand .... 83
A failure to make a jury demand waives a jury trial as to
amounts due plaintiff for services in a suit seeking specific perform-
ance of an employment contract and other relief. In Westerfield v.
Redmer,84 the plaintiff filed a suit in equity to compel performance
of an alleged oral agreement to form a corporation and employ the
plaintiff as manager. Finding that the contract was only for per-
sonal services furnished by the plaintiff at the defendants' request,
the chancellor denied equitable relief but did enter a $700 judg-
ment for the plaintiff as compensation for services.
On appeal, the appellate court, citing provisions of the 1933
Civil Practice Act, "which has very much modified the procedure
in civil actions at law and in equity,""5 and related Supreme Court
Rules, rejected the claim that the trial court, by enforcing a purely
common law right of action, had deprived defendants of their con-
stitutional right to trial by jury:
The matter of the employment of plaintiff by defendants was set
82. 116 Il1. App. 3d 206, 451 N.E.2d 1260 (1st Dist. 1983). The case is also discussed
supra part II.G.
83. Id. at 214, 451 N.E.2d at 1266-67.
84. 310 Ill. App. 246, 33 N.E.2d 744 (1st Dist. 1941). The case is also discussed infra
part I.P.
85. Id. at 248, 33 N.E.2d at 745.
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up in the bill, and while the prayer was for equitable relief
(namely, specific performance), the bill also prayed "for such
other and further relief in the premises as the court shall deem
equitable and just." It is true if the defendants had demanded
trial by jury of these issues as to the amount due to plaintiff for
his services, they would have been entitled to it .... They made
no such motion. They demanded no such trial .... [T]he jury
must be regarded as waived.86
There are circumstances in which parties who have the right to
trial by jury are deemed by action or inaction to have waived the
right. For example, although mandamus proceedings are consid-
ered actions at law in which the parties have the right to present
issues of fact to a jury, that right may be waived and waiver may be
implied if the parties proceed to a trial before the court without
objection. In People ex rel First National Bank of Hammond v.
Czaszewicz,87 the court granted a writ of mandamus requiring the
former city treasurer of West Hammond, Illinois, to file with the
city clerk a detailed accounting showing all receipts and expendi-
tures and all transactions as city treasurer during the fiscal year
ending April 1915. The writ sought an accounting to show the
state of the treasury as it concerned certain special assessment
funds, and required the former city treasurer to pay to his succes-
sor in office $2,300 to credit those funds. On the question of
waiver of jury trial, the court said:
The bill of exceptions shows no demand for a jury and no objec-
tion to proceeding with the trial by the court. A mandamus pro-
ceeding is an action at law, and parties to it have the right to have
the issues of fact tried by a jury. But this right may be waived.
Such waiver need not be expressly stated, but is implied if the
parties proceed with the trial before the court without
objection.88
J. Waiver of Jury Demand By Proceeding to Trial
on Equity Issues
Proceeding to trial on an equity count may operate to waive a
jury demand on law issues and law counts. For example, in Power
Electric Contractors, Inc. v. Maywood-Proviso State Bank,8 9 the de-
fendant filed a counterclaim and demand for jury trial in response
to a two-count complaint in the chancery division of the trial
86. Id. at 250, 33 N.E.2d at 746.
87. 295 Ill. 11, 128 N.E. 739 (1920).
88. Id. at 15, 128 N.E. at 740.
89. 60 Il. App. 3d 685, 377 N.E.2d 142 (1st Dist. 1978).
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court. The suit then proceeded to trial before the court on the eq-
uity matter. The fact questions underlying both the legal and the
equitable claims were identical. The court ruled:
[B]ecause of the identity of the factual issues raised by the com-
plaint and by the counterclaim, defendants' conduct in proceed-
ing to trial before [the trial judge] amounted to a waiver of their
jury demand. As our review of the pleadings has shown, the fac-
tual issues upon which depended plaintiff's right to a mechanic's
lien were identical to those upon which depended defendants'
right to recover on the counterclaim, namely which of the parties
breached the contract, and what damages flowed therefrom....
According to the record before us, defendants first raised this is-
sue when they filed their response to plaintiff's motion for judg-
ment on the counterclaim .... There are numerous other cases
which hold that a party may, by conduct, waive its demand for a
jury trial. To accept defendants' position would allow them a
second opportunity to litigate the factual issues underlying this
case in clear violation of the doctrine of res judicata. 9°
In Rozema v. Quinn,9 a mechanic's lien foreclosure action, the
defendants, after filing a counterclaim asserting an action at law for
a money judgment and demanding a jury trial, submitted a request
to the chancellor for general reference, thus indicating to the court
and the plaintiff that the defendants were not abiding by their ear-
lier request for jury trial on the counterclaim. The court held:
Plaintiff made no objection but proceeded to trial before the
master. It is clear that had plaintiff sought to sever the law ac-
tion or had he desired a trial by jury, it was incumbent upon him
to raise these points before the court when the reference was
made. When no timely objection was forthcoming from plaintiff,
the court properly determined that the causes should be tried to-
gether, and the reference operated to that effect .... Since the
jury was waived by the action of the parties, the chancellor had
jurisdiction to hear both the legal and equitable actions. 92
If a party demands and is denied a jury trial where the issues are
properly triable by a jury as of right, there cannot be a waiver of
the right to trial by jury. In Gariepy v. Springer,9" where the de-
fendant demanded and was denied a jury trial on law issues
presented by a new count (for compensatory and punitive dam-
90. Id. at 689, 377 N.E.2d at 145-46 (citations omitted).
91. 51 Ill. App. 2d 479, 201 N.E.2d 649 (1st Dist. 1964). The case is also discussed
supra parts II.A. and II.D, and infra part II.V.
92. Rozema, 51 111. App. 2d at 487, 201 N.E.2d at 653.
93. 318 I1. App. 523, 48 N.E.2d 572 (1st Dist. 1943). The case is also discussed
supra part II.D.
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ages) added to the original complaint for injunctive relief against
publication of alleged libelous matter, the appellate court held that
the defendant had not waived the right to a jury trial by proceeding
to a hearing before a master in chancery:
However, he had no other recourse. Having demanded trial by
jury and being denied that right by the court's order, he was
obliged to proceed with the hearing before the master.... In the
case at bar the court did not refer the cause to a master for hear-
ing until after defendant's motion for a jury was denied. Having
insisted upon a trial by jury and having preserved his objections
to the court's denial, it was not necessary for defendant to object
to every other step that took place during the progress of the
case.
94
K. Claims for Monetary Relief Cognizable Under Equity
Principles Without a Jury, Notwithstanding a Jury
Demand
A court may act in equity in awarding damages after plaintiffs
voluntarily dismiss their specific performance claims. When a trial
court has jurisdiction over a suit in which the plaintiff is seeking
equitable relief, such as one by a vendee seeking specific perform-
ance and damages against a vendor under a real estate sales con-
tract, the court may award damages as equitable relief in lieu of
specific performance relief. In such circumstances, the parties are
not entitled to trial by jury on the claim for damages. In Gordon v.
Bauer,95 the court held that the trial court acted in equity in
awarding damages to the plaintiff-contract purchasers when the
purchasers, after nine days of a nineteen day trial, voluntarily dis-
missed their specific performance claims so that the defendants
were not entitled to try the damage claim before a jury:
[T]he damages awarded to the [plaintiffs] were in the form of
equitable relief which the trial court could properly grant even
after dismissing the specific performance claims .... If the court
had acted at law, the [defendants] could have requested a jury
trial and the court could have granted that request at its discre-
tion. Because the court acted in equity, however, the [defend-
ants] were not entitled to a jury trial, and thus the court did not
act improperly by continuing with the bench trial.96
Where fixing and apportioning a loss is beyond the capacity of
94. Gariepy, 318 Ill. App. at 532, 48 N.E.2d at 576.
95. 177 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 532 N.E.2d 855 (5th Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 125 Ill. 2d
564, 537 N.E.2d 809 (1989). The case is also discussed supra part II.E.
96. Gordon, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 1081, 532 N.E.2d at 862-63 (citations omitted).
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the average jury, the action is cognizable in equity. Equitable juris-
diction, based on the principles of avoiding a multiplicity of suits
and on the necessity of an equitable accounting, exists notwith-
standing statutes that permit free joinder. Jay-Bee Realty Corp. v.
Agricultural Insurance Co. 97 was a proceeding against twenty-two
insurance companies to determine the insurers respective liabilities
under forty-five Michigan standard fire insurance policies covering
plaintiff's frame hotel building and its contents. The hotel had
been destroyed by a fire. Concluding that the liabilities of the de-
fendants were interrelated and interdependent, that the question of
multiplicity of suits was involved, and that the case also presented
the necessity of an accounting to fix pro rata amounts for which
the defendants might be liable, the appellate court also noted that
the "[n]ecessity for an accounting in the present case is greater
[than in certain cited cases] .... Fixing the total loss within any
reasonable degree of accuracy, or correctly apportioning the loss
among the various defendants would be beyond the average
jury. g98
Where, by statute, the court is to fix the amount of price
overcharges for which treble damages are allowable, no trial by
jury is required. O'Brien v. Brown99 concerned an action filed
under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 seeking
treble damages for alleged rent overcharges. After the presentation
of evidence, the trial judge directed the jury, impaneled pursuant to
the defendant's jury demand, to find that the defendant had de-
manded and received $1,320 in violation of the statute. Thereafter,
the court entered a judgment against defendant for three times the
overcharge ($3960) plus an additional $500 as reasonable attorney
fees, and also directed the jury to find the issues for the plaintiff on
the defendant's counterclaim for expenses to repair damage to the
premises.
On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment against the defend-
ant as to the plaintiff's statutory claim but reversed and remanded
on defendant's counterclaim. As to the defendant's assertion that
liability under the Emergency Price Control Act was limited to an
''amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge"
to be fixed "as determined by the Court" and that the imposition of
damages by the judge at some figure between the overcharge and
97. 320 Ill. App. 310, 50 N.E.2d 973 (1st Dist. 1943).
98. Id. at 317, 50 N.E.2d at 978 (citations omitted).
99. 403 11. 183, 85 N.E.2d 685, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949).
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three times that amount deprived him of a trial by jury, the court
said:
[T]he constitutional right argued for is not impaired when the
amount of damages is found by a court, after a jury or a pleading
has established a factual basis out of which damages arise. The
guaranty of the [1870] constitution is "the right of trial by a jury
as heretofore enjoyed." This means the right as it existed at com-
mon law. At common law an assessment of damages is an in-
quest of office, usually performed by the sheriff upon a writ of
inquiry of damages, or might be assessed by the court. It has
been distinctly held that assessment of damages is not a trial, and
does not come within the provisions of the constitution. °
L. Claims for Monetary Relief Not Cognizable Under Equity
Principles and Therefore Subject to Trial by Jury
The request for an accounting does not state a cause of action for
equitable relief unless it also appears that alternative common law
remedies are inadequate or that the accounting sought is so com-
plicated that it cannot be ascertained by a jury. In Sonney Amuse-
ment Enterprises v. Astor-Entertainment Co.,1O° the court held that
the mere allegation that a theater was exhibiting a film owned by
the plaintiff under some arrangement with a third person to whom
payment for such exhibition was to be made, did not state a cause
of action for injunctive relief. The court ruled that there was no
allegation: (a) that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy
at law; or that; (b) either the defendant was insolvent or could not
respond in damages; or (c) the film could not be restored to the
plaintiff by replevin or other action; or (d) the film had any unique
value; or (e) the accounting requested by plaintiff was too compli-
cated or intricate and could not be ascertained by a jury.
In mechanic's lien enforcement suits where no liens are found to
exist, a statute allowing chancellors to enter money judgments for
amounts due intrudes on the right to trial by jury. The legislature
may not defeat the right to a jury trial by transferring a cause
which is legal in nature to an equity court where the right to a jury
trial exists. In Turnes v. Brenckle,10 2 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the 1903 amendment to the Mechanic's Lien Act al-
lowing a personal decree to be entered where the right to a lien had
been denied, was unconstitutional because the legislation (1) con-
100. Id. at 193, 85 N.E.2d at 691 (citations omitted).
101. 339 Il. App. 275, 89 N.E.2d 746 (1st Dist. 1950).
102. 249 Ill. 394, 94 N.E. 495 (1911). The case is also discussed supra part IIF, and
infra part II.N.
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stituted class legislation, and (2) because it denied the defendant
his right to a trial by jury, as that action would be virtually an
action at law:
While the power of a court of equity to enter a personal decree
for a deficiency after there has been a sale has been recognized,
we are not aware of any case which holds that the court may
enter a personal decree where there has been an entire failure to
establish a lien under the statute. The amendment of 1903 was
manifestly intended to give the court the power to enter a per-
sonal decree under circumstances where no such power existed
before. . . . The right of trial by jury in respect to matters
wherein such right existed at the time the Constitution was
adopted cannot be taken away, directly or indirectly, by transfer-
ring the jurisdiction to try purely legal cases to a court of chan-
cery, where, according to the usual practice, juries are not
demandable as a matter of right. A party who directly invokes
the jurisdiction of equity thereby waives his right to demand a
jury, but such action on the part of a plaintiff cannot deprive the
defendant of his right to a jury trial. 10 3
In Gage v. Ewing,"° the Illinois Supreme Court held that a suit
to set aside tax deeds as clouds upon title to unimproved and unoc-
cupied land, filed pursuant to an 1872 statute that conferred juris-
diction upon chancery in suits to quiet title or remove clouds from
title to such real estate, remains within the jurisdiction of the court
of equity. The court ruled that equity courts retain jurisdiction
despite the constitutional right that requires a jury to be impaneled
to decide certain matters and notwithstanding that there is an
analogous common law remedy of ejectment.
A money judgment on motion filed after entry of a default judg-
ment in a mechanic's lien foreclosure suit, is not allowed where it
circumvents the right to jury trial. In Swords v. Risser,"5 the ap-
pellate court ruled that the trial court erred when it granted a
money judgment on the plaintiff's motion filed subsequent to the
entry of a default judgment in a mechanic's lien foreclosure suit.
The defendant had sold the property to a third party, thus preclud-
ing a foreclosure sale that would have allowed for a deficiency
judgment. The court held that the lien foreclosure complaint had
failed to request a personal money judgment, and the plaintiff was
not permitted to deprive the defendant of the right to a jury trial by
allowing recovery on contract rather than on a lien:
103. Turnes, 249 Ill. at 401, 94 N.E. at 496-97.
104. 107 Ill. 11 (1883). The case is also discussed supra part II.F.
105. 55 Ill. App. 3d 676, 371 N.E.2d 182 (4th Dist. 1977).
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If the plaintiff's motion for judgment at law is treated as an
amendment to the complaint to foreclose the mechanic's lien
seeking judgment under a contract, the right to jury trial upon
timely demand for purposes of such judgment remains the law.
Prior to the filing of such pleading defendant had no right to
demand a jury trial. Plaintiff in our case erred by not filing an
amended pleading which would have entitled him to new relief.
The trial court erred in not requiring an amended pleading before
granting the new relief, and in proclaiming that the issues were
res judicata. It is well established that a substantial amendment
to a complaint under which a default judgment has been entered
vacates the default judgment.' °6
Monetary recovery on an insurance policy, sought under an eq-
uitable bill for discovery, intrudes on the right to trial by jury. In
Henry v. East & West Insurance Co. of New Haven,0 7 a bill for the
discovery of the terms of a lost fire policy and for recovery under
the policy was held to be improper in view of objections that the
complainant had an adequate remedy at law and that the bill de-
prived the defendant of the right of a trial by jury. Since the com-
plainant knew the contents of the policy, the policy was available,
and the discovery remedy was available by a motion to produce,
the bill constituted an attempt to use discovery as a means for ob-
taining relief of a purely legal nature.
M. Statutes that Grant Jury Trial Rights in Actions Not Covered
by the Constitutional Guaranty of Jury Trial
The legislature may extend the right to trial by jury to areas of
litigation not previously subject to jury trial. Except where pro-
vided by statute, the guaranty of jury trial in civil cases applies
only to common law actions. Thus, except where expressly given
by statute, jury trial is never allowed in chancery proceedings as a
matter of right.
The right to trial by jury exists not only "as heretofore enjoyed"
as stated in the Illinois Constitution, but also in whatever addi-
tional litigation the legislature by statute has extended that right.
As stated in People v. Woerly,'0 8 a case in which the court held that
the appellant had been improperly denied his statutory right to
jury trial in a reckless driving case:
When the drafters of the constitution of 1870 wrote in section 5
of article II that, "the right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed,
106. Id. at 679, 371 N.E.2d at 184 (citation omitted).
107. 292 Il1. App. 646, 10 N.E.2d 972 (3d Dist. 1937) (unpublished opinion).
108. 50 Ill. 2d 327, 278 N.E.2d 787 (1972).
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shall remain inviolate," they were using language identical with
that used in the preceding constitutions of 1848 and 1818. The
solicitude underlying section 5 and its predecessors was for the
protection of the right to jury. Plainly it was designed to safe-
guard the right from violation or destruction; it was not to pre-
vent the legislature from extending the right to further areas of
litigation.... The legislature did not offend the constitution of
1870 when it broadened the right to trial by jury. "o9
A jury trial is never a matter of right in chancery proceedings,
unless it is expressly given by statute. This rule was the basis for
the ruling in Flaherty v. Murphy,110 in which the court rejected the
defendant's claim of a right to a jury in a chancery proceeding,
filed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had filed suit under the Dram-
shop Act in order to subject property owned by the defendant to a
lien and sale in order to satisfy a judgment previously recovered in
an action at law against a saloon-owner tenant of that property.
The court held that no statute provided for a jury trial in such a
proceeding, and "[T]here was no right of trial by jury on such issue
. .. , or on one analogous thereto, provided for under the laws of
this state prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1870. The
chancellor, therefore, did not err in denying [defendant's] demand
for a jury."' III
The constitutional right to trial by jury does, however, extend to
certain issues that arise in chancery proceedings. Thus in Cooper v.
Williams,1 2 the appellate court disapproved a permanent injunc-
tion that had been awarded to the plaintiffs directing the defendant
to remove a gate constructed to close a lane that ran to the defend-
ant's property. The plaintiff alleged ownership of the property
upon which the gate had been constructed, and the defendant as-
serted ownership of the land by adverse possession. The court held
that title to property must initially be determined as a common law
matter, and on that matter, the defendant had the right to demand
a jury:
Except in certain statutorily enumerated situations, the constitu-
tional guaranty of a jury trial applies only to actions known to
the common law and is not a matter of right in equity proceed-
ings. Certainly, a suit for an injunction is an action in equity.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that when a plain-
tiff seeks an injunction against a continuing trespass, alleging
109. Id. at 329, 278 N.E.2d at 788.
110. 291 Il. 595, 126 N.E. 553 (1920). The case is also discussed supra part IIB.
111. Id. at 598, 126 N.E. at 554-55.
112. 60 I11. App. 3d 634, 376 N.E.2d 1104 (3d Dist. 1978).
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ownership in the property, and the defendant's answer denies
ownership in the plaintiff, "the legal right must be determined in
an action at law before there can be a resort to equity." As a
result, title should have been determined in a court of law, en-
abling the defendant to demand a jury, before a determination of
the propriety of issuing the sought-after injunction was had in
equity. 113
Where legality of a will is subject to jury trial, the court may
sever issues and direct that issue to be tried by jury. In cases con-
testing either the admission of a will to probate or the denial of a
will to probate, there is a statutory right to trial by jury: "Any
party to the proceeding may demand a trial by jury. "' 4 Flynn v.
Troesch, 15 a suit by first cousins of the testator to contest his will,
involved issues regarding the validity of the will and the validity of
the testator's marriage to the person named as a principal benefici-
ary in the will. The trial court entered an order severing the issue
of the legality of the marriage from that of the legality of the will
and directed that the issue involving the marriage be tried sepa-
rately before the court, after which, the plaintiffs stipulated in writ-
ing to try both issues without a jury:
In such a case, involving two material issues, the plaintiff was
entitled to a jury trial only upon the will issue, but the other is-
sue, of marriage, was triable by the court without a jury. The
contention of the plaintiffs that the court was without authority
to sever these two issues is without merit, as ... the Civil Prac-
tice Act . . . clearly indicates that an action involving materially
different issues may be severed by the court and our rule ... has
recognized the principle by providing "equitable issues shall be
heard and decided in the manner heretofore practiced in courts
of equity." Such practice heretofore has been to try the question
of heirship by the court and the validity of a will by a jury....
In order to enable the plaintiffs to prevail, there must be a suc-
cessful will contest and also a decree holding void the marriage
between Helen and David Shannahan. The law provides that the
first of these issues may be tried by a jury, the other by the court;
they involve different characters of proof and may affect, differ-
ently, the competency of witnesses. The question in this case,
however, is largely academic, because of a written stipulation to
113. Id. at 635, 376 N.E.2d at 1104-05 (citations omitted).
114. Probate Act of 1975, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. -, paras. 8-1(c), 8-2(c) (19-) (article
8 is titled "Will Contests," subsection (c) of § 8-1 is subtitled "Contest of admission of
will to probate," and subsection (c) of § 8-2 is subtitled "Contest of denial of admission of
will to probate").
115. 373 Ill. 275, 26 N.E.2d 91 (1940).
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try both issues without a jury." 16
N. Jury Trial Under Statutes that Create Special Statutory
Proceedings
The right to jury trial on a common law claim does not disap-
pear when the claim is permitted to be joined in a special statutory
proceeding. In Twin-City Inn, Inc. v. Hahne Enterprises, Inc., " 7 a
lessor brought suit to recover (pursuant to amendments to the For-
cible Entry and Detainer Act 18) possession of the leased commer-
cial premises and the amount of rent allegedly due. A judgment
against the defendant lessee and its surety was reversed, and the
case was remanded because defendants were entitled to a jury trial
on the rent claim. The defendants had this right whether or not a
jury was assured concerning the possessory component of the case:
The scope of the possessory action was thus expanded by permit-
ting the inclusion of a claim for rent. Such a claim, however, is
based upon a contract, express or implied, and was clearly cogni-
zable at common law.... Even if, therefore, the action of forci-
ble entry and detainer is regarded as a special statutory
proceeding unknown to the common law, to which the constitu-
tional right of trial by jury does not extend, the right to a jury
trial upon a common law claim does not disappear when that
claim is permitted to be joined in the special statutory
proceeding. "9
The Illinois constitutional right to jury trial does not automati-
cally apply in special proceedings created by statute. Thus, when
the General Assembly creates special or statutory proceedings un-
known to the common law, no constitutional guarantee of jury
trial attaches to those proceedings. In City of Monmouth v. Pollu-
tion Control Board,2 ° the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency sought a fine and a cease and desist order against the city
concerning a sewerage lagoon system that was emitting obnoxious
odors. The Pollution Control Board levied a $2,000 fine and re-
quired the city to cease and desist within six months from permit-
ting the emission of odors. The supreme court held that an appeal
from the cease and desist aspect of the case was moot and the im-
116. Id. at 278, 26 N.E.2d at 93.
117. 37 Ill. 2d 133, 225 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
118. The most relevant amendment, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, para. 5 (1937), added
the words: "Provided, however, that a claim for rent may be joined in the complaint, and
judgment obtained for the amount of rent found due." Id.
119. Twin-City Inn, 37 Ill. 2d at 138, 225 N.E.2d at 633.
120. 57 11. 2d 482, 313 N.E.2d 161 (1974).
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position of a penalty was improper in view of the city's coopera-
tion; the court also rejected the city's claims that the fine was a
criminal penalty and that in any event the city had a constitutional
right to jury trial. "The constitutional guarantee that 'the right to
trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate' has been
consistently interpreted by this court as inapplicable to special or
statutory proceedings unknown to the common law.' 12 '
In In re Grabow's Estate,12 2 the appellate court similarly rejected
a legatee's claim of a right to trial by jury on evidence concerning
objections to an executor's accounting. The court held that "this
provision does not confer a right to a jury in any class of cases
where either it had not previously existed or the proceeding was
created by statute and was unknown to the common law."' 123
A statute may not deprive litigants of their constitutional right
to a jury trial in a common law claim simply because the statute
authorizes that the claim be litigated in chancery. A statute that,
in a mechanic's lien enforcement proceeding, subjects to the court's
discretion a right to jury trial granted as to amounts due where a
lien is not allowed, is invalid. In Turnes v. Brenckle, 24 the court
declared invalid a mechanic's lien law amendment that authorized
a court of chancery, in its discretion, to allow recovery, as at law,
to a lien-claimant where the court finds that the claimant is not
entitled to a lien:
The right of trial by jury in respect to matters wherein such right
existed at the time the Constitution was adopted cannot be taken
away, directly or indirectly, by transferring the jurisdiction to try
purely legal cases to a court of chancery, where, according to the
usual practice, juries are not demandable as a matter of right....
Whether the right to a jury trial exists in any given case depends
upon the nature of the controversy rather than upon the form of
the action. 125
There is no Illinois constitutional right to trial by jury under the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. 126
In Richard/Allen/Winter, Ltd. v. Waldorf,2 7 the trial court en-
121. Id. at 485, 313 N.E.2d at 163.
122. 74 Ill. App. 3d 336, 392 N.E.2d 980 (3d Dist. 1979). The case is also discussed
supra part II.C.
123. Grabow's Estate, 74 111. App. 3d at 337, 392 N.E.2d at 982.
124. 249 Ill. 394, 94 N.E. 495 (1911). The case is also discussed supra at II.F. and
II.L.
125. Turnes, 249 Ill. at 402, 94 N.E. at 497.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 261 (1989).
127. 156 Ill. App. 3d 717, 509 N.E.2d 1078 (2d Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 116111. 2d
575, 515 N.E.2d 126 (1987).
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tered a judgment following a jury verdict which found liability and
assessed compensatory and punitive damages under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.'2  The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a bench trial.
The court held that the Act creates a special or statutory proceed-
ing unknown to the common law, and there was neither a constitu-
tional nor a statutory right to jury trial on the claim:
This section has been judicially interpreted to stand for the prin-
ciple that the constitutional right to trial by jury does not extend
to actions unknown at common law. This constitutional provi-
sion does not require that a jury trial be had in every case or
preclude all restrictions on the exercise of that right .... [T]he
ICFDBPA is a statutory enactment which created a new cause of
action unknown at common law. Consequently, the counter-
plaintiffs in this case did not have a constitutionally guaranteed
right to trial by jury .... [T]he legislature intended that actions
brought under section 270a of the ICFDBPA are to be heard by
a judge sitting without a jury .... Therefore, since the ICFDBPA
has created a cause of action unknown at common law, and the
language of the Act does not specifically provide for a jury trial,
the trial court erred in granting the counterplaintiff's jury re-
quest. We reverse and remand for a bench trial. 29
Similarly, there is no Illinois constitutional right to trial by jury
in tax proceedings. Hoffman v. Department of Finance 130 was a
proceeding in which taxpayers sought review of the Department of
Finance's action of correcting certain tax returns and increasing
assessments against the taxpayers. On the question of the taxpay-
ers' right to trial by jury, the court found that "the Constitution
does not guarantee the right of trial by jury in tax proceedings.
The Constitution guarantees the right of a jury trial only as that
right existed at common law."' 3'
Further, there is no Illinois constitutional right to trial by jury in
chancery proceedings involving municipal code violations. In City
of Chicago v. Westphalen, 32 the city and private plaintiffs filed suit
pursuant to a section of the Illinois Municipal Code that author-
ized a proceeding in equity to restrain the violation of ordinances
governing building code violations. The trial judge denied the de-
fendant's motion for a jury trial, advising that although numerous
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 261 (1989).
129. 156 I11. App. 3d at 720, 509 N.E.2d at 1080-83 (citations omitted).
130. 374 I11. 494, 30 N.E.2d 34 (1940).
131. Id. at 498, 30 N.E.2d at 36.
132. 93 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 418 N.E.2d 63 (1st Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 996
(1982).
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municipal code violations were alleged, the case was a chancery
matter and would be treated as such. The appellate court agreed,
quoting with approval from an earlier case:
Where a new class of cases is directed by the legislature to be
tried in chancery, and it appears, when tested by the general prin-
ciples of equity, that they are of an equitable nature and can be
more appropriately tried in a court of equity than a court of law,
the chancellor will have the right, as in other cases in chancery,
to determine all questions of fact without submitting them to a
jury.
13 3
Addressing more family-related causes of action, there is no Illi-
nois constitutional right to trial by jury in paternity proceedings.
In People ex rel. Cizek v. Azzarello ' 34 and Clark v. Brown,'35 it was
noted that while the Paternity Act created a statutory right to jury
trial, there is no such right provided by the Constitution: "[I]n a
paternity proceeding there can be no question as to one's constitu-
tional right to trial by jury since this cause of action was not recog-
nized at common law."'' 36
There is no right to a jury trial in proceedings on a petition seek-
ing a finding of unfitness and termination of parental rights under
the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act, in the absence of a
specific provision in those Acts for trial by jury. In In re Wein-
stein, 13 7 denial of the respondent mother's motion for a jury trial
was upheld on appeal:
The fact that a jury trial was permitted under the old Family
Court Act does not establish that the right exists under the new
Juvenile Court Act .... Furthermore, the fact that a right ex-
isted under a prior Act does not mean it becomes a constitutional
guarantee. Proceedings under both the Juvenile Court Act and
the Adoption Act are created by statute and were unknown at
common law. The constitutional guarantee of a jury trial does
not apply to special or statutory proceedings which were un-
known to common law.138
There is no constitutional right to jury trial in delinquency pro-
ceedings conducted in the juvenile court, although under the Juve-
nile Court Act, juveniles may be proceeded against criminally with
133. Id. at 1128, 418 N.E.2d at 77 (quoting City of Highland Park v. Calder, 269 Ill.
App. 255, 261, 18 N.E.2d 123 (1932)).
134. 81 11. App. 3d 1102, 401 N.E.2d 1177 (1st Dist. 1980).
135. 121 Ill. App. 2d 280, 257 N.E.2d 565 (1st Dist. 1970).
136. Cizek, 81 Ill. App. 3d at 1105, 401 N.E.2d at 1181; Clark, 121 111. App. 2d at
280, 284, 257 N.E.2d at 565, 567.
137. 68 I11. App. 3d 883, 386 N.E.2d 593 (1st Dist. 1979).
138. Id. at 886, 386 N.E.2d at 594-95 (citations omitted).
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the right, therefore, to a jury trial. In re Fucini 139 was a delin-
quency adjudicatory proceeding in which a demand for trial by
jury had been made and denied. On appeal, the court concluded
that neither the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution, nor the jury-trial provisions of the
Illinois Constitution, require or grant a right to jury trial in such
proceedings. Quoting from an early Illinois case that had upheld
the Juvenile Court Act of 1899,1" the court agreed that:
[P]roceedings under the Act were not "according to the course of
the common law in which the right of a trial by jury is guaran-
teed, but the proceeding is a statutory one, and the statute....
[was] enacted since the adoption of the Constitution. There was
not, at the time of such adoption, the enjoyment of a jury trial in
such a case."'' 4 1
There is no Illinois constitutional right to trial by jury in admin-
istrative proceedings which were unknown at common law. Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Pollution Control Board 4 2 was an appeal
from an order of the Pollution Control Board denying a manufac-
turer of asphalt roofing a variance from the Environmental Protec-
tion Act. The court found that the manufacturer had caused air
pollution in amounts exceeding the permissible limits, and ordered
the manufacturer to cease and desist and assessed a penalty. The
appeal resulted in a remand to the Board for redetermination of an
appropriate penalty. As to the petitioner-manufacturer's asserted
constitutional right to trial by jury, however, the court said:
[T]he Act provides for the creation of an administrative agency
to enforce the Act. The constitutional guarantee of right to trial
by jury was never intended to apply to administrative proceed-
ings which were unknown at common law, and therefore, peti-
tioner cannot argue that this right has been abridged.'43
Cobin v. Illinois Pollution Control Board '" also involved an ap-
peal from orders of the Illinois Pollution Control Board. The
court held that the Board's cease and desist order against open
burning by the petitioner-operator of a salvage company was
proper, but that the assessment of a $3000 monetary penalty was
139. 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
140. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 I11. 328, 335-36, 100 N.E. 892, 895 (1913).
141. Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d at 310, 255 N.E.2d at 382.
142. 20 Ill. App. 3d 301, 314 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996
(1975), appeal on other grounds after remand, 46 Ill. App. 3d 412, 361 N.E.2d 23 (1st
Dist. 1977).
143. Id. at 310, 314 N.E.2d at 357-58.
144. 16 Ill. App. 3d 958, 307 N.E.2d 191 (5th Dist.), affirmed, 56 I11. 2d 582, 401
N.E.2d 1390 (1974).
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improper because grants of power to impose variable fines consti-
tute an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. The court
also upheld the denial by the Board of the petitioner's demand for
a jury trial and the petitioner's motion to transfer to the circuit
court:
The language [of the Illinois Constitution] may seem ambiguous,
but the courts have generally construed it as excluding special or
statutory proceedings, unknown at common law, from the tradi-
tional guarantee of a jury trial. The only rights which the section
was intended to preserve are those pertaining to the right of trial
by jury at common law and its essential features as known to the
common law tradition.
145
Moving to more statutory actions, there is no right to a jury
trial, absent a special provision allowing it, in a proceeding to en-
force the statutory liability of relatives for the support of poor per-
sons. In People ex rel. Peoria County v. Hill,'46 the supreme court
reversed a circuit court order quashing the complaint which sought
enforcement of the Pauper's Act, and on the jury trial question, the
court said:
It is only the right of trial by jury "as heretofore enjoyed" that
section 5 of article 2 of the constitution [of 1870] provides "shall
remain inviolate." The section was not intended to confer the
right of jury trial in any class of cases where it had not previously
existed; nor was it intended to introduce it into special summary
jurisdictions unknown to the common law, and which do not
provide for that mode of trial.147
The statutory provision for jury trial to try rights to property in
certain attachment and garnishment matters, does not require a
jury when the matter presents only questions of law. If the issue, as
stated in the pleadings of an attachment proceeding, presents only
questions of law, the court need not call a jury to try the right of
property. In Ray v. Keith, 4 8 a writ of attachment had been levied
upon land that the attachment-plaintiff asserted belonged to the
attachment-defendant. Also an interplea was filed claiming that
the land was the property of the interpleader and not that of the
attachment-defendant. The relevant statute provided that a jury be
impaneled to try the right of property. The court held, however,
that when there are no facts to be tried, no such jury is required:
[W]hen the claimant demurred to the amended replication, she
145. Id. at 964, 307 N.E.2d at 195 (citation omitted).
146. 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896).
147. Id. at 194, 46 N.E. at 799.
148. 218 Ill. 182, 75 N.E. 921 (1905).
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admitted the facts therein alleged, and upon overruling that de-
murrer she further elected to abide by the same, and submitted to
the court the question of law whether or not the facts so admitted
entitled her to a judgment for the property, or whether it was,
under those facts, subject to the attachment. While section 29 [of
the then Attachment Act] requires the court, upon the filing of
the interpleader, to immediately, unless good cause is shown by
either party for a continuance, direct a jury to be impaneled to
inquire into the right of property, when the result of the plead-
ings is to submit to the court only a question of law a jury is
dispensed with. 49
There is no right to jury trial under the Attorney's Lien Law.
Standidge v. Chicago Railways Co. 150 involved a petition filed to
enforce an attorney's lien. Notice of the petition had been served
upon the defendant pursuant to the Attorney's Lien Law. After
service of the notice, the defendant settled the underlying personal
injury claim with the attorney's client but without the attorney's
knowledge or consent. Judgment for $300 (one-third of the settle-
ment amount) was entered against the defendant and affirmed on
appeal:
[The] constitutional provision has never been held to prohibit the
Legislature from creating new rights unknown to the common
law and provide for their determination without a jury. Appel-
lant concedes that the attorney's lien law creates new rights
which have heretofore not been recognized in this state. This be-
ing conceded, it is clearly within the power of the Legislature to
provide for the enforcement of such rights without a jury trial.' 5
The same jury-trial issue was presented and similarly decided in
the more recent case Zazove v. Wilson. 5 2 Citing Standidge as au-
thority, 53 the appellate court rejected the defendants' claim of a
right to jury trial. The court affirmed the $1,350 judgment for the
attorney lien-claimants based on an agreed contingent fee arrange-
ment of 50% and a $2,700 settlement of the underlying personal
injury claim effected by the defendants' insurer with the attorneys'
client.
0. "Equitable Defenses" in Actions at Law
All questions that concern the issue of equitable estoppel, in-
cluding fact questions, may be determined by the court without a
149. Id. at 187, 75 N.E. at 923.
150. 254 I1. 524, 98 N.E. 963 (1912).
151. Id. at 532, 98 N.E. at 965 (citation omitted).
152. 334 Il. App. 594, 80 N.E.2d 101 (1st Dist. 1948).
153. Id. at 597, 80 N.E.2d at 102-03.
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jury when the issue is considered separately and prior to the under-
lying cause of action itself. In Vaughn v. Speaker,'54 the questions
concerning estoppel were: (a) whether the evidence raised the pos-
sibility that the defendant insurer's conduct equitably estopped de-
fendants from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to
plaintiffs' personal injury action; and (b) whether there was a con-
stitutional right to a jury trial on the equitable estoppel issue. The
court held that in hearings on the estoppel issue, no jury is
required:
Considering the totality of the alleged representations and con-
duct of the insurance company and the estate, we believe there is
a question for the trier of fact as to whether this conduct lulled
plaintiffs into delaying the filing of their suit and whether, if de-
fendant's conduct in this regard was unintentional, plaintiffs' reli-
ance in delaying suit was reasonable .... We do agree with the
appellate court that the estoppel issue should be determined by a
trier of fact other than the jury which may determine the merits
of the negligence action. We do not agree, however, that the es-
toppel issue must be determined by a separate jury. Equitable
estoppel, when considered separately and prior to the cause of
action itself, may be determined by the circuit court.... There is
no constitutional right to a jury trial in equitable proceedings or
proceedings seeking equitable relief. In accordance with section
2-1111 of the Civil Code, the circuit court may, of course, in its
discretion, use a jury to determine the estoppel issue. 5'
An "equitable defense" is to be disposed of before jury trial on
the basic action at law. In Williams v. Northern Trust Co.,56 a
plaintiff's action at law to recover earnest money paid upon a con-
tract for purchase of real estate had been met by a counterclaim in
the nature of an interpleader claim. The counterclaim alleged that
the defendant was only a trustee of the fund and offered to pay the
fund into the court. The trial court ordered that the equity ques-
tions be tried first. A decree was entered for the defendant, and the
plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The appeal was trans-
ferred for lack of a constitutional question to the appellate court.
The court affirmed the decree, adopting a quotation from a similar
1922 United States Supreme Court opinion: "Where an equitable
defense is interposed to a suit at law, the equitable issue raised
should first be disposed of as in a court of equity, and then if an
154. 126 Il. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988), affirming 156 Ill. App. 3d 962, 509
N.E.2d 1084 (3d Dist. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3218 (1989).
155. Vaughn, 126 I1. 2d at 166, 533 N.E.2d at 891-92 (citations omitted).
156. 316 Ill. App. 148, 44 N.E.2d 333 (lst Dist. 1942).
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issue at law remains, it is triable to a jury. 157
P. Power of Court in Cases Seeking Chancery Relief to Decide
All Law Issues Absent Jury Demands
Where a plaintiff seeks specific performance of an employment
contract and such further relief as the court deems equitable and
just, but there is no demand for a jury trial on the issues of the
amount due to the plaintiff for his services, the court does not
abuse its discretion if, after finding no ground for equitable relief,
the court tries the issues of the amounts due the plaintiff without a
jury and enters a money judgement. 15
Q. Jury Trial and Declaratory Judgment Actions
The right to jury trial refers to the common law at the time of
adoption of the Illinois Constitution. Where a taxpayer who is
seeking a declaratory judgment would not have been entitled to
trial by jury under the common law at the time of the adoption of
the Illinois Constitution, the taxpayer has no right to a jury. In
Berk v. Will County,159 the taxpayer requested a trial by jury in his
declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of
the Public Building Commission Act. The supreme court held that
the trial court did not violate the taxpayer's constitutional rights
when it denied that request. The issues presented and the relief
prayed for were not of such a nature as would entitle a party to
jury trial under the common law at the time of adoption of the
constitution. 16°
The proceedings must be examined to determine whether an ac-
tion is one in which there is a right to jury trial. Berk v. Will
County ' 61 also discusses the method one uses to determine whether
a particular declaratory judgment action is one in which there is a
constitutional right to trial by jury:
The determination of whether an action is an action at law and
one in which there is the constitutional right of jury trial can only
be resolved by an examination of the proceedings .... Such
[declaratory judgment] proceedings are neither legal nor equita-
ble actions, but have characteristics of both types of actions.
157. Id. at 152, 44 N.E.2d at 334 (quoting Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260
U.S. 235, 242 (1922)).
158. Westerfield v. Redmer, 310 I11. App. 246, 33 N.E.2d 744 (1st Dist. 1941). This
case is also discussed supra part I..
159. 34 111. 2d 588, 218 N.E.2d 98 (1966).
160. Id. at 588, 218 N.E.2d at 101.
161. Id. at 588, 218 N.E.2d at 98.
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While it is the practice in many courts to docket such cases as
law cases and in other courts as equity cases, such practices are
administrative only. This does not determine the matter of the
right to jury trial, nor does the mere fact that there is an issue of
fact create a right to jury trial. 62
The existence of an issue of fact in a declaratory judgment action
does not of itself create the right to jury trial. The supreme court,
in Berk,16 3 determined that the right to a jury trial in a declaratory
judgment proceeding does not depend upon "the mere fact that
there is an issue of fact" to be decided."M Further, in In Berk,16
the court said that the right to trial by jury does not depend on
where, for judicial administration purposes, the case has been filed
or docketed: "While it is the practice in many courts to docket
such cases as law cases and in other courts as equity cases, such
practices are administrative only."'' 66
That the declaratory judgment procedure was unknown to the
common law does not mean that there is no right to trial by jury in
such proceedings. Such proceedings are neither legal nor equita-
ble, and the right to a jury trial in any such case requires an exami-
nation of the nature of the relief sought and an examination of the
predominant characteristics of the underlying issues in dispute.
Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 167 was a case in
which the insurer of a manufacturer of asbestos products sought
declaratory judgment as to its obligations under the manufac-
turer's liability policy as well as the insurer's right to contribution
from other insurers with respect to asbestos-related litigation. The
manufacturer also sought declaratory judgment as to the liability
of the various insurers. The court affirmed the appellate court's
decision, including the court's approval of the trial court order
striking jury demands that had been filed by several of the insurers:
Actions for a declaratory judgment were unknown to the com-
mon law, and are neither legal nor equitable, but are sui generis.
Consequently, the right to trial by jury depends upon the relief
sought. When a declaration of rights is the only relief sought, the
predominant characteristics of the issues in dispute determine
whether there exists the right to a jury trial. If additional relief is
sought, the nature of that relief determines the right to a trial by
162. Id. at 591, 218 N.E.2d at 100-01.
163. Id. at 588, 218 N.E.2d at 98.
164. Id. at 591, 218 N.E.2d at 101.
165. Id. at 588, 218 N.E.2d at 98.
166. Id.
167. 118 Ill. 2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987), aff'g Zurich Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Ex-
cess & Surplus Ins. Co., 145 I11. App. 3d 175, 494 N.E.2d 634 (1st Dist. 1986).
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jury. . . . This case concerns a complaint and a counterclaim,
both of which seek only a declaratory judgment.... The issues
in dispute concern the construction of a contract. The construc-
tion of a contract and the determination of the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties to the contract are questions of law, the
determination of which rests exclusively with the court. For
these reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in-
sofar as it held that there was no right to a jury trial on either the
complaint or the counterclaim.16
The court's opinion in Zurich 169 also referred to an earlier deci-
sion, Lazarus v. Village of Northbrook. "0 Lazarus affirmed a decla-
ration of the invalidity of zoning ordinances as they applied to the
plaintiffs' property and held that the denial of a special use permit
for construction of a hospital in an industrial zone was improper.
A hospital use, the court said, would not be incompatible with
other uses in the neighborhood and would have no adverse effect
upon the other uses. Approving the trial court's action of striking
the Village's demand for a trial by jury on plaintiffs' motion the
court said:
What this provision [Article Two, Section Five of the Illinois
Constitution of 1870] guarantees is the right to trial by jury as it
existed in common law actions' when the constitution was
adopted. There was then and there is now no constitutional right
of trial by jury in equity. There may, of course, be disputed is-
sues of fact in a declaratory judgment action. When a declara-
tion alone is sought, and no further relief is requested, the right
to a trial by jury must be determined by an examination of the
disputed issues and an appraisal of their predominant character-
istics as indicating the appropriateness of legal or equitable relief.
But when, as is ordinarily the case, relief in addition to the naked
declaration of rights is sought, the nature of that relief deter-
mines the right to a trial by jury. Although the complaint in this
case was designated in the caption as a complaint at law, such a
designation, required ... as a matter of administrative conven-
ience, does not finally determine the right to a trial by jury. The
complaint contained a prayer for injunctive relief. It is the posi-
tion of the Village that the equitable relief thus sought was "an-
cillary" to the relief sought by way of declaratory judgment.
This position is unsound .... The Village was not deprived of its
constitutional right of trial by jury. 171
168. 118 Ill. 2d at 57, 514 N.E.2d at 166 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 23, 514 N.E.2d at 150.
170. 31 111. 2d 146, 199 N.E.2d 797 (1964); see supra note 38.
171. Id. at 148, 199 N.E.2d at 799 (citations omitted).
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An insurer has no right to a jury trial on either its complaint or a
manufacturer's counterclaim in a declaratory judgment action con-
cerning the manufacturer's liability policy. Thus, in Zurich,172
claims concerning the correct construction of an insurance con-
tract and a declaration of rights and obligations of the parties to
the contract constituted questions of law resting exclusively with
the court.
There is no right to a jury trial in an action seeking a declaration
that a zoning ordinance is invalid as applied to landowners' prop-
erty, where the landowners also seek other relief of a purely equita-
ble character. Thus, in Lazarus, 73 where plaintiff-landowners
sought injunctive relief as well as a declaratory judgment concern-
ing the validity of certain zoning ordinances, the Village had no
constitutional right to a trial by jury.
In a plaintiff-purchaser's declaratory action seeking return of a
down payment, there may exist questions of fact that are triable by
a jury. In Murphy v. Roppolo-Prendergast Builders, Inc.,"' issues
existed concerning what was a reasonable time for the defendant-
vendor-contractor to build a condominium unit and as to whether
the purchaser in fact had notified the vendor of the purchaser's
inability to obtain financing. Thus, the appellate court found that
the trial court's entry of a judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that a nineteen month lapse of time in the building of the unit was
unreasonable as a matter of law, was error:
[J]udgment on the pleadings is proper only if questions of law
and not of fact exist after the pleadings have been filed. Where
there are controverted questions of fact evidence from an exami-
nation of the pleadings, the trier of fact must hear evidence to
determine the correct facts and may not give judgment on the
pleadings alone .... The existence of these factual issues on the
face of the pleadings should have precluded the trial court's dis-
posal of this matter by judgment on the pleadings. 75
In a declaratory judgment action that involves the rights and
liabilities of a party on an account stated, a jury verdict is not
merely advisory, but has the effect of a common law jury verdict.
Burgard v. Mascoutah Lumber Co. 176 involved an action by a con-
tractor against a lumber company for a declaratory judgment stat-
ing the account between the parties and an accounting for that
172. Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 57, 514 N.E.2d at 166.
173. 31 111. 2d 146, 199 N.E.2d 797 (1964).
174. 117 Ill. App. 3d 415, 453 N.E.2d 846 (1st Dist. 1983).
175. Id. at 417, 453 N.E.2d at 848-49 (citation omitted).
176. 6 Ill. App. 2d 210, 127 N.E.2d 464 (4th Dist. 1955).
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same purpose. Under the statutory provision which provided for
the giving of further relief upon a declaration of rights and after
the jury found a balance due to the defendant, a judgment was
entered for the lumber company:
There is no technical form prescribed for the declaration of
rights; it is sufficient if the rights may be ascertained therefrom in
connection with the findings of court or jury in view of the con-
troversy presented .... In our opinion it is neither necessary nor
desirable to classify this type of action as at law or in chancery, it
may be docketed either way, but where issues of the kind here
involved are tried by a jury, the verdict is not merely advisory, it
has the effect of a jury verdict at law. To hold otherwise might
permit this procedure to evade the constitutional right of trial by
jury. 177
R. Jury Trial and Summary Judgment in Chancery Proceedings
Summary judgment in chancery proceedings is improper when
issues depend on facts to be decided by jury in law proceedings. In
such a case, a reversal of the judgment in the common law action
may also require reversal of the related chancery judgment. In
Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd. ,178 an action had
been instituted on a complaint in law seeking monetary relief for
alleged fraud. The defendant filed a counterclaim in equity seeking
injunctive relief. The plaintiffs' answer to the counterclaim raised
issues of the defendants' breach of warranty and performance of
their contractual duties, and also questioned the plaintiffs' right to
equitable relief. Judgment on the common law claim was reversed:
In raising the issues of breach of warranty and performance of
contractual duties by Strawberry Camel, Mother Earth's answer
called into question the right of Strawberry Camel to equitable
relief. Accordingly, the granting of such relief could only be
proper if it were found that these issues were without merit. Be-
cause determination of these issues depended on questions of fact
reserved for jury determination in Mother Earth's action at law,
our reversal of the judgment entered in the law division mandates
that the summary judgment entered for Strawberry Camel with-
out an evidentiary hearing in the chancery division must also be
reversed. 179
177. Id. at 219, 127 N.E.2d at 468.
178. 72 I11. App. 3d 37, 390 N.E.2d 393 (1st Dist. 1979), appeal after remand, 98 II1.
App. 3d 518, 424 N.E.2d 758 (1980).
179. Mother Earth, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 53, 390 N.E.2d at 406-07.
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S. Jury Trial and "Summary" Proceedings
There is no right to trial by jury in a summary proceeding such
as a proceeding by a former client to compel an attorney to surren-
der files held pursuant to the attorney's retaining lien. In Intaglio
Service Corp. v. J. L. Williams & Co.,1 80 the attorney performed
services for a client who failed to pay. The client filed a petition for
a summary proceeding seeking an order directing the attorney to
surrender his files for use in the defense of the suit by petitioner
and new counsel. The trial court held that a retaining lien existed,
and ordered that the client pay over $67,500 as security for pay-
ment of fees due or as a substitute for the retaining lien, the peti-
tioner should pay $27,500 directly to the attorney and the balance
to be held in escrow pending determination of the amount of fees
owed in an action already filed by the attorney. The appellate court
affirmed, holding, inter alia:
[A]lthough by filing a suit to recover attorney fees [the attorney]
became subject to discovery, he did not waive his right to his
retaining lien .... Since a proceeding to post security in lieu of a
retaining lien is a summary proceeding, [client] was not entitled
to a jury trial when it elected to pursue this route. But even if it
had been entitled to a jury trial, it waived that right when it failed
to file a jury demand with the petition.' 8 '
The same rule applies in proceedings by attorneys to enforce at-
torney's liens against defendants or their insurers, who after service
of notice of lien, settle directly with attorneys' clients. Thus, in
Zazove v. Wilson, 8 2 the appellate court ruled that "petitioners'
claim was based on their right to an attorneys' lien and defendants
were not entitled to a jury trial."
T Jury Trial on Remand After Appeal
When an appellate court concludes that a case in which the
plaintiff is seeking equitable relief involves only a common law
claim, the defendant can demand trial by jury. Upon remand,
Kaplan v. Kaplan 83 involved an employment agreement that was
found to be a retirement contract for the plaintiff, one of the own-
ers of a family owned close corporation. The trial court entered an
order permanently enjoining the company, another family mem-
ber, and others in active concert with them, from taking any action
180. 112 I11. App. 3d 824, 445 N.E.2d 1200 (1st Dist. 1983).
181. Id. at 832, 445 N.E.2d at 1201, 1205 (citation omitted).
182. 334 Ill. App. 594, 602-03, 80 N.E.2d 101, 107 (1st Dist. 1948).
183. 98 Ill. App. 3d 136, 423 N.E.2d 1253 (1st Dist. 1981).
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that would negatively affect plaintiff's employment relationship.
The defendants appealed. The appellate court held that:
The injury [plaintiff] complains of, which is a breach of the em-
ployment contract, is capable of being measured and corrected by
an award of money damages alone. In a suit for mandatory in-
junctive relief founded on breach of contract, in which there was
no evidence that defendant was insolvent so that plaintiff could
not collect a money judgment from defendant for such breach,
plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. . . . [T]he matter
before us involves a cognizable legal claim and, thus, Laurence
can now assert his demand for a jury trial."8 4
U. Jury Trial Is Not a Matter of Right as to Equitable Claims
As noted previously, the constitutional guaranty does not extend
to equity proceedings. In Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance
Co.,185 a suit in equity against sixteen insurers to recover on
nineteen fire policies was held proper in order to avoid a multiplic-
ity of suits and to perform an accounting to pro-rate the fire loss
among insurers. The court denied a trial by jury. Further, Mc-
Cowan v. McCowan 186 involved a separate maintenance suit in
which the purchaser of the husband's medical practice was di-
rected to pay the purchase price to the wife in satisfaction of sums
due to her from the husband rather than to the husband's corpora-
tion. The court again held that there was no right to jury trial.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Davis 18 7 was an interpleader suit
in which $1,100 deposited by plaintiff insurer as proceeds of a
group life insurance policy was awarded to the decedent's sister.
The court found that the decedent had been competent and was
not acting under undue influence when he changed the beneficiary
from his spouse to his sister. The issue was decided without a jury.
In foreclosure actions, there is no constitutional right to trial by
jury on affirmative defenses such as an assertion that the mortgagor
was incompetent to execute the principal note, trust deed and other
agreements, and that usury exists in an extension agreement. Such
actions are within the jurisdiction of chancery, and the constitu-
tional guarantee refers only to those actions that were known to
the common law. 88
184. Id. at 144, 423 N.E.2d at 1258-59 (citation omitted).
185. 359 Il1. 584, 195 N.E. 420 (1935). The case is also discussed supra part II.B.
186. 324 Il1. App. 520, 58 N.E.2d 338 (1st Dist. 1944) (abstract opinion).
187. 295 Ill. App. 582, 15 N.E.2d 874 (4th Dist. 1938).
188. Placzkiewicz v. Borgmeier, 286 Ill. App. 603, 3 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist. 1936)
(unpublished opinion).
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In partition proceedings, the parties are not entitled to a jury as
a matter of right, since the constitutional provision that preserves
the right of trial by jury makes no reference to cases in which
courts of equity have jurisdiction. Under the common law and
under the partition statute, which confer jurisdiction on courts of
chancery to partition land held by tenants in common whether title
is derived by purchase, devise or descent, courts of chancery have
jurisdiction over partition cases.'1 9
There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in chancery suits
by a corporation creditors against stockholders for amounts unpaid
on the stockholders' stock subscriptions. Such a suit was involved
in Parmelee v. Price. 19o The supreme court approved the appellate
court's affirmance of a decree dismissing the bill in equity and said
as to a jury trial:
The constitution of 1870 guarantees the right to a trial by jury
practically as that right existed at the common law. It does not
give the right to a jury trial in any class of cases in which that
right did not exist at common law. Where a new class of cases is
directed by the Legislature to be tried in chancery, and it ap-
pears, when tested by the general principles of equity, that they
are of an equitable nature, and can be more appropriately tried in
a court of equity than a court of law, the chancellor will have the
right, as in other cases in chancery, to determine all questions of
fact without submitting them to a jury. The constitutional provi-
sion in question "introduced no new rule of law, but merely pre-
served the right already existing. It does not apply to suits in
equity, or to any statutory proceeding to be had in courts of eq-
uity." The remedy given by this section is one which did not
exist at common law. The relief sought may involve the taking of
an account between the corporation and the stockholder and be-
tween the various stockholders, the appointment of a receiver,
and a marshaling of the assets of the corporation. It is apparent
that the machinery of the common law is inadequate for these
purposes, and that the right of a trial by jury does not exist.191
In a related fashion, there is no constitutional right to a trial by
jury in chancery proceedings initiated by the Attorney General to
dissolve a corporation. Where a new class of cases is directed to be
tried as chancery causes and it appears that they are of an equitable
character, either as to subject matter or the relief requested when
tested by the general principles of equity, a statute may provide for
189. Flaherty v. McCormick, 113 Ill. 538 (1885).
190. 208 Ill. 544, 70 N.E. 725 (1904).
191. Id. at 558, 70 N.E. at 729 (citations omitted).
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the determination of the questions of fact involved by the court
without submission to a jury. In Chicago Mutual Life Indemnity
Association v. Hunt,'92 the court characterized the Attorney Gen-
eral's suit as neither in the nature of a criminal prosecution nor a
quo warranto proceeding, but as a special civil proceeding brought
to protect and enforce property rights that had been assigned prop-
erly to the jurisdiction of courts of equity. Citing to its earlier
opinion Ward v. Farwell, 93 the court rejected the contention that
transferring suits to dissolve corporations from courts of law to
courts of equity deprived the corporations of the constitutional
right of trial by jury. 194
There is no right to jury trial in equity suits by judgment credi-
tors to have Dramshop Act judgments made into liens on the
properties in which the intoxicating liquor had been sold. In Fla-
herty v. Murphy, 95 the court declared that the test to determine
whether or not the right to trial by jury exists in a given case de-
pends on "the nature of the controversy, rather than the form of
the action" and on whether there was a "right of trial by jury on
such issue... or on one analogous thereto, provided for under the
laws of this state prior to the adoption of the Constitution."1 96
Whether a plan of distribution concerning the cost of an im-
provement is an equitable plan is a question for the court, not for
the jury. This is not to be confused with jury questions as to
whether the property has been assessed more than it is benefitted
or more than its proportionate share. In City of Monticello v. Le-
Crone, 97 property owners appealed a judgment entered after a
hearing was held on objections by property owners to a special as-
sessment for a sewer improvement. Holding that the only question
appropriate for jury determination was whether the objectors'
properties were benefitted to the extent of the amounts assessed
against those properties, the court noted:
Whether the plan of distribution of the cost of an improvement is
equitable is a question for the court, and this issue is not to be
confused with the questions whether property is assessed more
than it is benefitted or more than its proportionate share, as those
are only questions to be tried before a jury.198
192. 127 Il1. 257, 20 N.E. 55 (1889).
193. 97 Ill. 593 (1881).
194. Hunt, 127 Ill. at 275, 20 N.E. at 59.
195. 291 Ill. 595, 126 N.E. 553 (1920). This case is also discussed supra part II.B.
196. Id. at 598, 126 N.E. at 554-55.
197. 414 Ill. 550, 111 N.E.2d 338 (1953).
198. Id. at 558, Ill N.E.2d at 342.
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If the question of whether a motion picture is obscene arises in
the course of a suit in equity thus raising a constitutional issue, the
question of obscenity is not required to be passed upon by a jury.
American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago 199 involved a suit
by distributors of a motion picture, after refusal of a permit to dis-
tribute and exhibit the film in the city, for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief concerning the relevant city ordinance and its
enforcement. The defendants filed a jury demand and also claimed
that there was an adequate remedy at law by way of mandamus.
The court held that the city had the power to require submission of
films for censorship and deny a permit to those which are obscene.
The court remanded for the trial court to determine whether the
film in question was obscene. On the defendants' contention that a
jury must determine whether or not the film is obscene, the court
stated:
The proposition is based on the premises that this issue involves
only the applicability of the ordinance rather than its validity,
and that it may therefore be raised only in an action of manda-
mus brought to compel the issuance of a license. The proposition
also presupposes that a trial by jury may still be required in man-
damus actions, despite the language of the present statute and
that the question is an appropriate one for determination by ajury, even though the purpose of the proceeding is to review ad-
ministrative action. We need not consider whether these latter
assumptions are correct, since in the case before us the question
of the film's obscenity arises in the course of a suit in equity based
upon a constitutional question, and therefore need not be passed
upon by a jury.2°
V Jury Trial Is "Discretionary" in Actions that Are Equitable
in Nature or Raise Equitable Matters
In an equitable action, the trial court may impanel an advisory
jury, even over an objection by the parties. In Carroll v. Hurst,20
landowners sought to enjoin the defendant's operation of a junky-
ard and salvage operation on his land on theories of nuisance and
violation of zoning ordinances. Plaintiff-appellants argued that it
was error for the court first to impanel an advisory jury on its own
motion, and then to fail to either instruct the jury or apply the law
to the jury's findings, and finally to adopt the jury's findings when
rendering its decision. The appellate court disagreed, stating:
199. 3 Il1. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 979 (1955).
200. Id. at 351-52, 121 N.E.2d at 594.
201. 103 IlL. App. 3d 984, 431 N.E.2d 1344 (4th Dist. 1982).
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The impaneling of an advisory jury is within the discretion of the
trial court. The jury's verdict is only advisory; the trial court is
free to accept or reject the jury's findings, in whole or in part.
The court may impanel a jury under [then Civil Practice Act]
section 63 even though the parties in the proceeding object.2"2
In a similar application of the rule, Fisher v. Burgiel20 3 involved a
suit by the conservator of an incompetent person's estate to set
aside deeds executed by the ward and for defendants to account as
fiduciaries for certain money and personalty. The supreme court
rejected the defendants' contention that its jury demand should not
have been stricken.
It has also been held that the court in an equitable action may
properly refuse to submit certain questions to a second advisory
jury after a first jury has disagreed and has been discharged. In
such a case, the court may base a decree on the testimony already
heard.2 °4 In Smith v. Newton,2 °5 the court held that the chancellor
may submit the issues to a new jury or render a decree upon the
evidence presented after an advisory jury's finding was clearly
against the evidence.
Since mortgage foreclosure actions are equitable in nature, trial
by jury is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Only if trial
by jury is properly requested on particular issues, where there is a
right to jury trial, is it "imperative" that the chancellor direct those
issues to be tried by jury. Brown v. Miner20 6 was a mortgage fore-
closure suit in which the supreme court noted that no request in
fact had been made in the lower court to direct that the mental
capacity of one of the mortgagors be tried by jury. The court said:
Nor do we think there was error in the failure of the court to
send an issue as to the mental capacity of ... one of the mortga-
gors, to be tried by a jury. It does not appear that the court was
requested to direct the issue to be thus tried. The statutes of this
state require the submission to a jury of an issue arising upon the
contest of a will on the ground of insanity of the testator, or of
his want of mental capacity. The statute seems to be imperative
in this respect .... It would seem .. .where the question of
insanity of the defendant is properly presented by the pleadings
and by affidavit, that the better practice is to submit the question
of sanity to a jury. It by no means follows, however, that the
202. Id. at 991, 431 N.E.2d at 1349 (citation omitted).
203. 382 Ill. 42, 54, 46 N.E.2d 380, 386 (1943). This case is also discussed supra part
II.B.
204. Hardy v. Dyas, 203 Ill. 211, 67 N.E. 852 (1903).
205. 84 Ill. 14 (1876).
206. 128 Ill. 148, 21 N.E. 223 (1889).
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court is bound upon its own motion to submit such an issue, or
that it is error not to make such submission .... [T]he duty of
the court to submit an issue to be tried by a jury, was in the case
under consideration discretionary, not imperative.2 °7
Suits to foreclose trust deeds and obtain incidental deficiency
judgments are equitable in nature. Thus, trial by jury is, under
section 2-1111 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a matter of discre-
tion and not of right. In First State Bank of Princeton v. Lef-
felman,2 °s the trial court entered orders confirming a foreclosure
sale and granting a deficiency judgment for the trust deed benefici-
ary-plaintiff; the court rejected defendants' claim of the right to
jury trial to determine if there was a mortgage in existence. The
same result was reached in South Holland Trust & Savings Bank v.
Witvoet.2°
The trial court may, pursuant to section 2-1111 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, exercise its discretion to impanel an advisory jury
in order to determine whether a defendant is estopped to raise the
statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff's personal injury law-
suit. In Vaughn v. Speaker,21 ° the supreme court, in agreement
with the appellate court, held that: (1) when an issue of equitable
estoppel is considered separately and prior to a principal common
law negligence action, it should be determined by a trier of fact
other than the jury that may adjudicate the merits of the negli-
gence action; and (2) while there is no constitutional right to jury
trial as to such equitable relief, the trial court may in its discretion
impanel an advisory jury on the issue.
While a jury is a matter of statutory right in a will contest and
the request for trial by jury as to that matter must be timely made,
a jury trial is a matter of the trial court's discretion in equity litiga-
tion. Thus, where equitable issues are also included in the case, the
trial court acts within its allowable discretion in directing that the
equitable issues be tried before a jury. In Kelley v. First State Bank
of Princeton,2 ' the appellate court held that even assuming that
the plaintiffs' request for jury trial was untimely as to the will con-
test there presented, the granting of the request as to the equitable
issues in the case was not prejudicial in light of the trial court's
discretionary power.
A suit that involves only the enforcement of a mechanic's lien is
207. Id. at 154, 21 N.E. at 224.
208. 167 Ill. App. 3d 362, 521 N.E.2d 195 (2d Dist. 1988).
209. 18 Ill. App. 3d 24, 309 N.E.2d 306 (1st Dist. 1974).
210. 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3218, (1989).
211. 81 111. App. 3d 402, 401 N.E.2d 247 (3d Dist. 1980).
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an action in equity in which neither party has a right to demand
trial by jury, but if jury trial is demanded then the granting of the
demand is discretionary. The court's discretion concerning jury
trial extends also to defenses that are asserted to defeat the plain-
tiff's cause of action rather than to obtain affirmative relief. In
Rozema v. Quinn,2 12 where the answer alleged that the plaintiff's
work was so defective as to amount to a lack of substantial per-
formance of the terms of the oral contract, and prayed that the lien
action be dismissed for want of equity, the appellate court noted:
"Such [a] defense merely defeats the plaintiff's cause of action and
does not seek affirmative relief, and a jury trial under such circum-
stances would also have been discretionary with the court. 21 3
Where, in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, an issue is
presented as to the defendant's capacity to execute the note and
mortgage, the decision of whether or not to direct that issue to a
jury is within the court's discretion. The court's duty is not imper-
ative under such circumstances but is discretionary. In Brown v.
Miner,2 14 no request had been made to the chancellor to direct that
the mental capacity of one of the mortgagors be tried by jury.
Also, in Myatt v. Walker,215 the court held that in chancery pro-
ceedings involving questions of insanity, it is the court's duty to
direct that an issue be formed and tried by a jury.
Similarly, in a suit by a conservator of an incompetent person to
set aside deeds and transfers of personalty by the ward, and for an
accounting, the chancellor has discretion to call a jury on questions
of fact. "Trial by jury in [equity] cases does not exist as a matter of
right, except in certain enumerated cases. ' 216  In Fisher v.
Burgiel,217 the supreme court held that the chancellor did not com-
mit reversible error in striking defendants' jury demand.
In proceedings to assess damages against the plaintiff upon dis-
solution of an injunction that defendant claims has been wrong-
fully issued, it is discretionary with the chancellor to decide
whether there shall be a trial by jury. In Holmes v. Stateler,1 s the
court pointed out that such proceedings are not new proceedings
212. 51 Ill. App. 2d 479, 201 N.E.2d 649 (1st Dist. 1964). The case is also discussed
supra part II.A., II.D., and 11.J.
213. Rozema, 51 111. App. 2d at 483, 201 N.E.2d at 652 (citation omitted).
214. 128 Ill. 148, 21 N.E. 223 (1889). The case is also discussed supra part II.V.
215. 44 Il. 485 (1867).
216. Fisher v. Burgiel, 382 Ill. 42, 54, 46 N.E.2d 380, 386 (1943).
217. 382 Ill. 42, 54, 46 N.E.2d 380, 386 (1943). The case is also discussed supra parts
II.B. and II.W.
218. 57 Ill. 209 (1870).
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but are part of the original chancery suit, and that proceedings
seeking "damages" do not invariably implicate a common law
right to jury trial:
It was a part of a proceeding in chancery, where trial by jury is
not a matter of right. It is only discretionary with the chancellor,
whether there shall be formed an issue of fact to be tried by a
jury. It is not an answer to say that it involves the rendition of a
decree for damages. This court and the circuit courts have ren-
dered judgments for damages on the dismissal of appeals, for
more than a quarter of a century, without the right being ques-
tioned. And on the dissolution of an injunction, restraining the
execution of a judgment, such damages have been awarded under
the statute for a much longer period without the right being ques-
tioned, so far as our observation has extended.21 9
W. The Verdict of a "Discretionary" Jury Is Advisory Only
Where the judge in a chancery case exercises discretion to allow
a jury trial, the verdict of that jury is merely advisory and is not
binding on the chancellor. 220  This means, among other things,
that, in a chancery case, an issue that is not required by the consti-
tution or by statute to be submitted to a jury, but is, nonetheless,
tried before a jury, the chancellor has discretion either to reject the
jury verdict and enter a decree contrary to that verdict, or to grant
a new trial, as the chancellor believes justice requires. 22' Further,
if a matter goes to the jury in an action seeking equitable relief as
well as damages, the chancellor need not accept the jury's verdict
as to the matters in chancery.222
Where the granting of a jury trial in an equity case is discretion-
ary with the trial court, the advisory verdict of such a jury binds
neither the trial court nor a reviewing court.223 The advisory char-
acter of the verdict of an advisory jury has also been interpreted to
mean that the trial court, in its discretion, may submit any issue or
issues to a jury in an advisory capacity on matters of fact 224 and
219. Id. at 214-15.
220. Fisher v. Burgiel, 382 Ill. 42, 54, 46 N.E.2d 380, 386 (1943). The case is also
discussed supra part II.B.
221. Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff, 180 Ill. 407, 411, 54 N.E. 333, 334 (1899); see also
Kelly v. Kelly, 126 Ill. 550, 18 N.E. 785 (1888).
222. Pasulka v. Koob, 170 Ill. App. 3d 191, 202, 524 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Dist.
1988), appeal denied, 122 Il1. 2d 579, 530 N.E.2d 250 (3d Dist. 1988).
223. City of Chicago v. North Chicago News, Inc., 106 Ill. App. 3d 587, 595, 435
N.E.2d 887, 893 (2d Dist. 1982).
224. Fleming v. Fleming, 85 I11. App. 3d 532, 541, 406 N.E.2d 879, 885 (5th Dist.
1980).
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that the court is free to accept or reject the jury's findings in whole
or in part.225
The submission to a jury of questions of fact rests in the chancel-
lor's discretion, and even when so submitted, the chancellor is not
bound by the jury's verdict on questions of fact. In Keith v. Hen-
kleman,226 the supreme court approved the appellate court's judg-
ment affirming a decree of the superior court of Cook County that
reformed an injunction bond and enforced the bond by assessing
the damages recoverable under it. As to the contention that the
damages should have been assessed by a jury, the court said, in
part:
The rule, however, in this state, is that it is discretionary with the
chancellor to require the issues of fact arising in equity cases to
be tried by a jury before the entry of a decree. The chancellor is
the sole judge of the evidence and its weight; and, when he di-
rects an issue of fact to be tried by jury, to inform his conscience,
he may adopt the verdict of the jury, or he may disregard it.227
Also, in chancery cases, where trial of an issue by a jury is
merely advisory to the chancellor, the supreme court held in Riehl
v. Riehl:221
[T]he parties are entitled to the judgment of the chancellor upon
the issues of fact in the case .... If the court is satisfied with the
verdict, he may adopt it and render a decree in accordance there-
with, or he may, without setting aside the verdict, render a decree
contrary thereto.229
In Pittenger v. Pittenger,230 after noting that the chancellor "may
adopt the verdict or set the same aside, and resubmit the question
to the jury, or he may disregard it and enter such a decree as in his
judgment equity demands," it was decided that:
The final decree shows that it was based not only upon a consid-
eration by the chancellor of the evidence, but also upon a consid-
eration of the finding made by the jury; and it may be that the
chancellor did not rely as completely upon his own interpretation
of the evidence as he would have done if there had been no action
on the part of the jury.2 3
225. Caroll v. Hurst, 103 Ill. App. 3d 984, 991, 431 N.E.2d 1344, 1349 (4th Dist.
1982). This case is also discussed supra part II.V.
226. 173 Ill. 137, 50 N.E. 692 (1898). The case is also discussed supra part II.C.
227. Id. at 139, 50 N.E. at 693.
228. 247 Ill. 475, 93 N.E. 318 (1910).
229. Id. at 477, 93 N.E. at 319 (1910) (suit to set aside a deed and for partition).
230. 208 Ill. 582, 70 N.E. 699 (1904).
231. Id. at 596, 70 N.E. at 704 (1904).
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In Stevens v. Shannahan,232 the court reversed a decree enjoining
the sale of land under a mortgage and requiring an accounting yet
approved the trial court's action of disregarding the jury finding
that a grantor had been incompetent at the time that she executed
the deed. The court stated:
[I]n this state the rule in respect to verdicts of juries on issues out
of chancery that are not required by statute to be submitted to a
jury is that the chancellor may either act upon such verdict, or
disregard it, and find the issue himself, as in his opinion and judg-
ment the weight of the evidence may justify.23 3
In Jones v. Glos 2 34 and Larson v. Glos,23 5 the court held:
Even the verdict of a jury in a chancery case, where the issue is
not required by the Constitution or a statute to be submitted to a
jury, is advisory only, although the chancellor supervises the
trial, and the verdict is based only upon legal and competent evi-
dence admitted by him, and is found under instructions from
him. The purpose of such a verdict is to inform the conscience of
the chancellor, who is the sole judge of the evidence, and is in no
manner bound by the verdict, but may either accept or reject it,
as he believes justice requires.236
The following are examples of equity claims as to which the
chancellor is not bound by the verdict of an advisory jury. The first
is a suit to set aside an antenuptial agreement. Where a party seeks
to set aside an antenuptial agreement, any error in submitting the
issue of the validity of the agreement to a jury is not prejudicial to
that party in light of the fact that the trial court is not bound by
the jury's advisory verdict and is free to disregard the verdict in its
entirety. This principle applies whether the issue put to the jury
was a question of law or a question of fact.237
Second, in a suit in equity for reformation of a deed and to have
title to a tract described in the deed, the verdict of the jury is advi-
sory only. "[T]he jury and the chancellor were justified in finding
that fraud was committed," because "[t]he decree shows that it
was not based upon the verdict of the jury, alone, but was the re-
sult of an independent consideration of the evidence by the court in
connection with the verdict of the jury.238
Third, in a suit to set aside a deed for fraud or undue influence
232. 160 Ill. 330, 340, 43 N.E. 350, 353 (1896).
233. Id.
234. 236 Ill. 178, 86 N.E. 282 (1908).
235. 235 Ill. 584, 85 N.E. 926 (1908).
236. Id. at 587, 85 N.E. at 927.
237. Id.
238. Dunn v. Heasley, 375 Ill. 43, 50, 30 N.E.2d 628, 630 (1940).
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where the issue is whether its execution was procured by fraud or
undue influence, and the chancellor is "satisfied to rest a final de-
cree, without reference to any verdict that the jury might render,
the chancellor may discharge the jury without a verdict, or, as was
done in this case, direct a verdict in accordance with the court's
views, and render a decree accordingly." 239
Fourth, in a suit involving the issue of sanity, the chancellor is
not bound by the verdict of an advisory jury. In an equity suit
when the issue of sanity is sent to a jury, as distinct from an action
in which the issue concerns whether a writing is the will of a testa-
tor (in the latter action there is a statutory right to trial by jury),
the court may set aside the verdict even though it is not so mani-
festly contrary to the evidence as to raise a presumption of fraud or
partisanship.2"
Finally, the chancellor is not found in a suit to prevent termina-
tion of lease. In actions of a nature such as a tenant's equitable
counterclaim seeking to prevent termination of a lease, there is no
statutory right to a jury trial. "[M]oreover, even if a jury is em-
paneled, it serves a purely advisory function, [and the tenant] suf-
fered no prejudice as a result of the court's denial of his request for
jury a trial" on that counterclaim.24'
X. Reviewability of Chancellor's Actions Concerning
Advisory Juries
The chancellor's action of allowing or refusing a jury trial of
issues of fact is not reviewable and may not be assigned as error.
In Maynard v. Richards,24 2 a suit to settle accounts between the
estate of a deceased partner and the surviving partner, the court
stated, "The whole of the account of [the surviving partner], in-
cluding the item as to [sums due an attorney for] fees, was thus
brought within the equitable jurisdiction of the circuit court. ' 243
Since the verdict of a jury in a chancery suit is merely advisory,
rulings on the admission of evidence on the hearing of an issue in a
chancery suit may not be reviewable and cannot be assigned as
error. Peabody v. Kendall 244 was a suit to set aside deeds for lack
of mental capacity, lack of consideration, lack of delivery, and for
239. DeGraffv. Manz, 251 Il1. 531, 96 N.E. 516 (1911).
240. Stevens v. Shannahan, 160 Il. 330, 331, 43 N.E. 350, 353 (1896).
241. Yuan Kane Ing v. Levy, 26 I1. App. 3d 889, 892, 326 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1st Dist.
1975).
242. 166 Ill. 466, 486, 46 N.E. 1138, 1144 (1897).
243. Id.
244. 145 Ill. 519, 521, 32 N.E. 674, 675 (1892).
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fraud and undue influence allegedly practiced upon the grantor.
The supreme court reversed a decree entered by the chancellor in
accordance with a jury verdict for the complainants, in which the
court held that because the jury verdict was not binding, any ruling
of the court on the admission or rejection of evidence during the
trial would not affect the decree which the court finally rendered.
Y Review of Trial Court Discretion in Denying
Advisory Jury Trial
Since the granting of a jury trial in equity cases is discretionary
with the trial court, the denial of a jury demand is not error unless
an abuse of discretion is shown. In Kjellesvik v. Shannon,24 5 a for-
mer wife was denied a jury trial in the former husband's proceed-
ing to modify the divorce decree and to transfer custody of their
daughter to him. Sidwell v. Sidwel1246 was a wife's action asserting
special equities in her husband's property and seeking alimony and
attorneys fees. Rejection of the claim of right to a jury trial by the
husband, who had previously obtained a divorce in another state,
was approved because "[d]enial of the jury demand is not error in
the absence of an abuse of discretion. 247
There is no abuse of discretion when the court denied a jury
demand in a custody modification matter. Where a former hus-
band sought modification of the child custody provision of a previ-
ously entered divorce decree, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the determination of the child's best inter-
ests was better left to the court and in rejecting the former wife's
demand for a jury trial.24 s
The abuse of discretion standard applies as to the denial of a
discretionary jury in adoption proceedings. The allegedly unfit fa-
ther of a child is not entitled to a jury trial in an adoption proceed-
ing by the mother and her second husband, and denial of the
natural father's demand for a jury trial is not erroneous, absent a
showing of abuse of discretion.249
There is no abuse of discretion when court failed to impanel a
jury in mortgage foreclosure suit. In a suit to foreclose a mortgage
given as security for debts owed the plaintiff partnership for serv-
ices rendered by it, the trial court's failure to direct that issues be
245. 41 111. App. 3d 674, 678, 355 N.E.2d 120, 125 (3d Dist. 1976).
246. 28 Il1. App. 3d 580, 585, 328 N.E.2d 595, 599 (4th Dist. 1975).
247. Id.
248. Kjellesvik v. Shannon, 41 111. App. 3d 674, 355 N.E.2d 120 (3d Dist. 1976).
249. Houston v. Brackett, 38 Ill. App. 2d 463, 187 N.E.2d 545 (2d Dist. 1963).
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tried by a jury does not constitute an abuse of discretion, even if
there are questions of fact as to the employment of the partners to
represent the defendant, the services rendered, the fair and reason-
able value of those services, and the partners' expenses.250
There is no abuse of discretion in refusing jury trial in an insur-
ance-proceeds interpleader action. In an interpleader proceeding
to determine who, as between an insured's widow and his sister, is
entitled to the proceeds of a group life insurance policy, the court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit to a jury the issue
of whether the insured was insane when he changed the beneficiary
from the widow to the sister.25'
Z. Review of Trial Court Discretion in
Allowing Advisory Jury Trial
In a suit to set aside a will, it was proper under the predecessor
statute252 to submit to the jury questions of fact as to whether the
complainant was the heir at law of the testatrix, even though the
questions related to whether the court had jurisdiction and "the
verdict of findings was advisory, only. '253
Further, there is no abuse of discretion when a court submits an
equitable issue as to rescission of a home sales agreement to a jury,
along with law issues. In an action brought by home buyers to
recover damages and for rescission of the sales contract for defects
in a new home built and sold by the defendant, the trial court did
not err in submitting to the jury, along with common law issues,
the equitable issue of whether the home buyers were entitled to
rescind the sales agreement. The home buyers were entitled to
seek both remedies, legal and equitable, even though inconsistent,
in the absence of an election of one remedy or the other. In Finke
v. Woodard,254 the court also held, as to the rescission remedy rec-
ommended by the jury and adopted by the trial court:
Since the jury recommended rescission, the trial court accepted
their verdict, and we have affirmed this remedy, those questions
as to what the proper measure of damages should be is moot.
The only remaining question is the appropriate amount of resti-
250. Lundy v. Messer, 25 Ill. App. 2d 513, 167 N.E.2d 278 (2d Dist. 1960), appeal
after remand, 32 I11. App. 2d 303, 177 N.E.2d 863 (1961). The case is also discussed
supra at II.E.
251. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 295 Ill. App. 582, 15 N.E.2d 874 (4th Dist.
1938).
252. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1111 (1989) (current version).
253. Stone v. Salisbury, 209 Ill. 56, 68, 70 N.E. 605, 609 (1904).
254. 122 Ill. App. 3d 911, 919, 462 N.E.2d 13, 18 (4th Dist. 1984).
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tution to which plaintiffs are entitled to return them to the status
quo ante.255
AA. Title to Land and the Right to Jury Trial
in Chancery Cases
Title to land is an issue to which the right to trial by jury ex-
tends. Thus, where ownership of real estate becomes an issue,
either by claim of adverse possession or otherwise, a jury is re-
quired on that issue if demanded by either party. In Cooper v. Wil-
liams, 256 the trial court, after granting plaintiffs' motion to strike
defendant's jury demand and trying the suit without a jury, entered
judgment directing the defendant to remove a certain gate that she
had constructed in order to close access to a lane that ran to her
property. Plaintiffs claimed that the lane ran across their property
to the defendant's property, and defendant asserted the affirmative
defense that she had acquired ownership of the land through which
the lane ran by adverse possession. Judgment granting the injunc-
tive relief was reversed and the cause remanded:
Except in certain statutorily enumerated situations, the constitu-
tional guaranty of a jury trial applies only to actions known to
the common law and is not a matter of right in equity proceed-
ings. Certainly, a suit for an injunction is an action in equity.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that when a plain-
tiff seeks an injunction against a continuing trespass, alleging
ownership in the property, and the defendant's answer denies
ownership in the plaintiff, "the legal right must be determined in
an action at law before there can be a resort to equity." As a
result, title should have been determined in a court of law, en-
abling the defendant to demand a jury, before a determination of
the propriety of issuing the sought-after injunction was had in
equity.257
The defendant in an equity suit to cancel deeds is entitled to
demand a jury trial if the remedy is determined to be solely at law.
The general rule is that there is no jurisdiction to grant chancery
relief in a case if there is an available adequate alternative common
law remedy. The right to trial by jury exists, of course, in an ac-
tion for such a common law remedy. Fleming v. Reheis25 8 was a
suit in equity to set aside deeds and enjoin prosecution of an action
in ejectment, where the evidence did not sustain the grounds upon
255. Id. at 921, 462 N.E.2d at 20.
256. 60 Ill. App. 3d 634, 376 N.E.2d 1104 (3d Dist. 1978).
257. Id. at 635, 376 N.E.2d at 1104-05 (citations omitted).
258. 275 Il1. 132, 113 N.E. 923 (1916).
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which the right to equitable relief was predicated. The chancellor's
decree granted the requested relief, however, based on the chancel-
lor's findings of lack of consideration and lack of delivery. The
supreme court reversed, holding that the plaintiff's only proper
remedy was at law, and the defendant was entitled to have a jury
hear evidence on the matter of whether or not there had been a
delivery of the deed in question.
Where a third party interplead in an attachment action claims
ownership of the land levied upon, and an issue is formed as to
whether the attachment-debtor has an equitable interest subject to
attachment, the issue should be submitted to a jury. In Laclede
Bank v. Keeler,259 the court interpreted the then Attachment Act,
noting:
The evident purpose of the amendment was to render equitable
interests in lands subject to attachment to the same extent as
legal titles .... The statute in terms provides that when the issue
is made on filing an interpleader, the court shall cause a jury to
be impanelled to try the issue. Nor does the statute make any
distinction between legal and equitable titles. It is peremptory
that the issue shall be tried, and tried by a jury.2' 6
There is no right to a jury trial in a suit to establish title under
the Burnt Records Act in an equity court. Heacock v. Hosmer26
affirmed a trial court decree granting a petition brought under that
Act to restore the title to a certain tract of land in Cook County,
holding that the case was indeed within the jurisdiction of chan-
cery. Noting first that the statute expressly confers jurisdiction on
courts of chancery,262 the supreme court held that the statute does
not deprive parties of their constitutional right to trial by jury:
It has been a common practice for years to file bills in equity to
partition lands, and in a proceeding of that character the court
has ample power to settle all conflicting titles, and that, too, with-
out a jury. The power conferred upon a court of equity by the
Burnt Records act is similar to a proceeding in equity for parti-
tion, and a proceeding under the former act is no more obnoxious
to the constitutional provision for a jury than is a bill in equity
for partition.263
259. 103 I1. 425 (1903).
260. Id. at 428-29.
261. 109 Ill. 245 (1884).
262. Id. at 249.
263. Id. at 251; see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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BB. Civil Contempt Proceedings and the Right to Trial by Jury
In contempt proceedings of a civil nature, there is no right to
trial by jury. Even where possible incarceration is pursuant to civil
contempt proceedings and where actual incarceration is consistent
with proceedings of a civil nature, the contemnor-respondent is not
entitled to trial by jury. In People v. Schmoll,26M a defendant's
claim that he was entitled to trial by jury on his contempt charge,
because after six months' imprisonment the incarceration was for a
serious contempt offense, was rejected. Under prosecution for
theft by deception and forgery, the defendant had repeatedly re-
fused to comply with requests and an order for handwriting exem-
plars and was held in contempt and incarcerated for refusing to
comply with the order. The trial court directed that the defend-
ant's release from incarceration would be contingent upon his com-
plying with the order, and the appellate court affirmed:
It is our opinion that the present cause falls clearly within the
realm of civil contempt, since defendant has repeatedly refused to
comply with a discovery order entered by the court to provide
information that had been properly requested by the state. The
imprisonment which was imposed on defendant is an attempt by
the trial court to coerce him into complying with that order. The
court has not imposed a specific term of imprisonment on defend-
ant, but rather, in the classic terms, defendant has the keys to his
prison in his own pocket and need merely comply with the order
to be released.265
Also, in People v. Burkert,266 the supreme court reversed on other
grounds the judgment of contempt and commitment for a term of
six months and approved the denial by the trial court of a motion
for jury trial on the question of whether the defendant, a witness
before a grand jury, was guilty of contempt. The court noted that
"here the defendant admitted his refusal to answer before the
grand jury. There was thus no factual issue to be tried, by jury or
otherwise. '267
264. 77 Ill. App. 3d 762, 396 N.E.2d 634 (2d Dist. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980).
265. Id. at 765, 396 N.E.2d at 637-38.
266. 7 Il1. 2d 506, 513, 131 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1955).
267. Id.
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III. APPENDIX: "JURY TRIAL" IN CERTAIN OTHER STATUTES
In addition to the basic civil practice laws and rules noted in
Part One, there are a number of other Illinois statutory references
to jury trial that are relevant to some civil cases which the Illinois
constitutional right to trial by jury may not extend, or which impli-
cate aspects of chancery jurisprudence. Some of these additional
references are here described or quoted below. Any emphasis is
added by the author.
A. Agriculture and Horticulture-Inspection and Standardiza-
tion of Farm Products. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, para. 102.15
(1989).
Confiscation and disposition of seized articles. Procedure-Re-
lease of articles not in violation of Act.
Any product seized pursuant to the provisions of this Act may
be proceeded against either before or after permission to take cor-
rective action in any court within the jurisdiction of which the
same may be found, and seized for condemnation and confisca-
tion; and authority and jurisdiction are vested in the several
courts to issue the warrant and to hear and determine the pro-
ceedings herein provided for.... The hearing shall be summary,
and except as herein otherwise provided, shall conform, as near
as may be to the proceedings in civil cases before such court;
however, either party may demand a trial by jury.
B. Animals-Service of Stallions and Jacks. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 8, para. 59-9 (1989).
Actions for services-Finding of court-Verdict--Costs.
In all actions prosecuted under the provisions of this Act, the
court or jury who shall try the same, or make an assessment of
damages therein, shall in addition to finding the sum due the
plaintiff, also find that the same is due for the service fee of plain-
tiff's stallion or jack and is a lien on the mare or jennet or prog-
eny thereof, or both, as described in plaintiff's claim for lien:
Provided, however, that if the court orjury shall find the amount
due the plaintiff is not a lien upon the property described in the
plaintiff's claim for lien, the plaintiff's action shall not be dis-
missed thereby if personal service of summons has been had upon
the defendant, but the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment as in
other civil actions ....
C. Cities and Villages-Illinois Municipal Code-Corporate
Powers and Functions-Public Health, Safety and Welfare-
1991]
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Powers Over Certain Businesses. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para.
11-42-11.1. (1989).
Community antenna television system-Interference with and
payment for access.
(d) [an action by a building owner to enforce a claim against a
community antenna television company franchisee of a munici-
pality to pay just compensation for the franchisee's construction
and installation of demand] may require that the amount of just
compensation be determined by a jury.
(f) ... (iv) [in an action by a public utility, railroad, or owner
or operator of an oil, petroleum product, chemical or gas pipe-
line, to enforce a claim against a community antenna television
company franchisee for just compensation, the plaintiff] "upon
timely demand, may require that the amount of just compensa-
tion be determined by a jury.
D. Counties-Counties Code-Powers and Duties of County
Boards. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, para. 5-1096 (1989).
Community antenna television systems-Interference with and
payment for access.
(d) [in an action by a building owner to enforce a claim
against a community antenna television company franchisee of a
county to pay just compensation for the franchisee's construction
and installation of cable television facilities within and upon the
building, the building owner] upon timely demand, may require
that the amount of just compensation be determined by a jury.
(f) [in an action by a public utility, railroad, or owner or oper-
ator of an oil, petroleum product, chemical or gas pipeline, to
enforce a claim against a community antenna television company
franchisee for just compensation, the plaintiff] upon timely de-
mand, may require that the amount of just compensation be de-
termined by a jury.
E. Courts-Juvenile Court Act of 1987-Delinquent Minors.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 805-35 (1987).
Habitual Juvenile Offender.
... trial on a petition to adjudicate a juvenile as an Habitual
Juvenile Offender, shall be by jury unless the minor demands, in
open court and with advice of counsel, a trial by the court with-
out jury.
F. Domestic Relations-Domestic Violence Act of 1986--Or-
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ders of Protection. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-14(12)
(1986).
Order of Protection Remedies.
Order for payment of losses... suffered as a direct result of the
abuse.... [A] respondent shall have a right to trial by jury on the
issue of whether to require payment under this paragraph, except
for reimbursement of losses affecting family needs.., and reim-
bursement of petitioner's attorney's fees and court costs.
G. Domestic Relations-Parentage Act of 1984. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 2513 (1984).
Civil Action; Jury.
[A party may demand] trial by jury on the issue of parentage.
H. Liens-Horseshoer's Lien. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, para.
210 (1989).
Assessment of damages.
In all actions prosecuted under the provisions of this act, the
court or jury, who shall try the same, or make an assessment of
damages therein, shall in addition to finding the sum due to the
plaintiff, also find that the same is due for the cost of shoeing the
horse, mule, ox or other animal described in plaintiff's claim for
lien and is a lien upon the same: Provided, however, that if the
court or jury shall find the amount due the plaintiff is not a lien
upon the property described in the plaintiff's claim for lien, the
plaintiff's action shall not be dismissed thereby if personal service
of summons has been had upon the defendant, but the plaintiff
shall be entitled to judgment as in other civil actions.
I. Mental Health-Miscellaneous Laws-Persons in Need of
Mental Treatment Confined in Certain Penal Institutions. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 142 (1987).
Hearing on petition-trial-court order.
[In a hearing on a petition to subject a person to involuntary
admission to an institution in accordance with procedures pre-
scribed in the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Code,] if the jury by its verdict, or the court if no jury is re-
quested, finds that the named person is not subject to involuntary
admission, he shall be returned to the institution to which he was
sentenced and committed. If the jury by its verdict, or the court
if no jury is requested, finds that the named person is subject to
Loyola University Law Journal
involuntary admission, the court shall commit him to the De-
partment of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.
J. Practice-Code of Civil Procedure-Attachment. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 4-134 (1989).
Intervention.
[In all cases of attachment when any third person by verified
petition claims the property attached or garnisheed, the court]
shall immediately (unless good cause be shown by either party
for a continuance) direct a jury to be impaneled to inquire into
the right of the property.
K. Professions and Occupations-Department of Professional
Regulation-Barber, Cosmetology and Esthetics Schools. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 1703B-6 (1987).
Private right of action.
[In any action brought by a person who seeks damages for a
violation of this article] the court in its discretion may award ac-
tual damages, treble actual damages if fraud is proved, injunctive
relief, and any other relief which the court deems proper.... In
any action brought by a person under this Section, the court may
award, in addition to the relief provided in this Section, reason-
able attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party. Either
party to an action under this Section may request a trial by jury.
L. Professions and Occupations-Department of Conserva-
tion-Timber Buyers. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 716
(1987).
[In an action seeking confiscation or forfeiture of timber,
equipment or vehicles seized for alleged use in violation of the
Act,] the owner of such property may have ajury determine the
illegality of its use.
M. Public Health and Safety-Nursing Home Care Act-
Rights and Responsibilities-Licensing, Enforcement, Viola-
tions, Penalties and Remedies. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
para. 4153-607 (1989).
Jury trial-Waivers.
Any party to an action brought under Sections 3-601 through
3-607 [§ 3-602 allows a facility resident, whose rights are violated
by a licensee, triple damages, costs and attorneys fees; § 3-603
allows a resident to maintain an action for any other type of re-
lief, including injunctive and declaratory relief, permitted by law]
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shall be entitled to a trial by jury and any waiver of the right to a
trial by jury, whether oral or in writing, prior to the commence-
ment of an action, shall be null and void, and without legal force
or effect.
N. Revenue-Coin-Operated Amusement Device Tax Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 481b.15 (1986).
Search warrant-Seizure of property-Trial-Redemption by
owner-Disposition of forfeited devices.
[After seizure of property in accordance with this Act] the
court or jury, if a jury shall be demanded, shall proceed to deter-
mine whether or not such property so seized was displayed in
violation of this Act. In case of a finding that the amusement
device seized was, at the time of seizure, being displayed in viola-
tion of this Act, judgment shall be entered confiscating and
forfeiting the property to the State and ordering its delivery to
the Department, and in addition thereto, the court shall have
power to tax and assess the costs of the proceedings.
0. Universities, Colleges, Academies, Etc.-Private Business
and Vocational Schools Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, para.
161.2 (1989).
Private right of action.
The court in its discretion may award actual damages, treble
actual damages if fraud is proved, injunctive relief, and any other
relief which the court deems proper. In any action brought by a
person under this Section, the court may award, in addition to
the relief provided in this Section, reasonable attorney's fees and
costs to the prevailing party. Either party to an action under this
Section may request a trial by jury.
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